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The Flurry of Tax Law Changes 
Following the 2005 Hurricanes 
A STRATEGY FOR MORE PREDICTABLE AND 
EQUITABLE TAX TREATMENT OF VICTIMS 
Patrick E. Tolan, Jr.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether we face an active hurricane season, like this year, or a 
below-normal season, the crucial message for every person is the 
same:  prepare, prepare, prepare. 
—Max Mayfield, National Hurricane Center Director, May 2006.1 
Although experts had predicted the increased hurricane 
activity of the past two years,2 the U.S. response to the 2005 
hurricanes was anything but adequate.3  In the months 
  
 † Professor Tolan, BSEE United States Air Force Academy, J.D. University 
of Michigan Law School, LL.M. George Washington University, is an Assistant 
Professor of Law at Barry University Law School in Orlando, Florida, where he teaches 
tax, environmental law, government contracts, and property.  The author thanks 
Jessica Jordan for her outstanding research in support of this article and Professors 
Frank Schiavo and Stephen Leacock for their constructive advice. 
 1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association [hereinafter NOAA], NOAA 
Predicts Very Active 2006 North Atlantic Hurricane Season–Residents in Hurricane 
Prone Areas Urged to Make Preparations, NOAA MAGAZINE, May 22, 2006, 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2006/s2634.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
 2 “It appears the Atlantic Ocean is beginning to enter another active period, 
posing more danger to the East Coast than the previous period of activity because of 
increased population and economic development.”  H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 3-4 
(2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1102, 1104 (Dr. Chris Landsea, NOAA 
Hurricane Research Division, testimony before the House Committee on Science). 
 3 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [hereinafter GAO], 
EXPEDITED ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: FEMA’S 
CONTROL WEAKNESSES EXPOSED THE GOVERNMENT TO SIGNIFICANT FRAUD AND ABUSE, 
GAO-06-655 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-396, at 2 (2006) (“It is well-documented that the 
response at all levels of government was inadequate”).  It could be argued that the 
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following the most destructive hurricane season the world has 
ever known,4 virtually every aspect of the U.S. response has 
been scrutinized.5  This article examines the tax relief 
measures that were triggered by Hurricane Katrina and the 
later hurricanes of 2005.  Unfortunately, the tax system is not 
as predictable as its meteorological counterpart.6 
While the post-hurricane Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) pronouncements and the 2005-2006 legislation arguably 
afforded the most generous tax relief in U.S. history,7 at the 
same time it created six different classes of 2005 victims for tax 
purposes.  Improved tax relief should be extended equally to all 
victims of disasters.  Unless and until our national leaders 
develop permanent, equitable tax treatment for victims of all 
disasters, American businesses, especially small businesses, 
and the American people, particularly the poor, are ill suited to 
weather the storm.   
This article begins by putting emergency tax relief in 
perspective.  The first half of the article is factual.  Part II 
provides background on the magnitude of the hurricanes of 
2005 in the context of other national disasters.  The section 
discusses insurance as a traditional safeguard to catastrophic 
  
magnitude of the 2005 hurricanes could not be predicted, but the record reflects 
otherwise.  See GAO, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO 
SECURITIZE NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM RISK 1, GAO-03-1033 (2003) 
(major hurricane loss to U.S. could be as high as $110 billion; major earthquake losses 
could reach $225 billion).  
 4 FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE 
KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 1, 5-9 (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED]. “Measuring 
destructiveness in terms of damage to property rather than loss of life is a useful way 
to compare disasters.  Loss of life reflects both the magnitude of the disaster, as well as 
the quality of the response, while property destruction correlates more directly to the 
magnitude of the disaster alone.”  Id. at 151 n.2. 
 5 Id. at 51-64 (discussing critical failures that undermined and prevented a 
more efficient and effective federal response).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 109-377 (2006); 
H.R. REP. NO. 109-396 (2006) (discussing flaws in emergency response coordination and 
control). 
 6 For a detailed examination of tropical storm prediction accuracy and 
methodology, see generally JAMES L. FRANKLIN, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER–
NOAA/NWS/NCEP/TROPICAL PREDICTION CENTER, 2005 NATIONAL HURRICANE 
CENTER FORECAST VERIFICATION REPORT 1 (May 21, 2006), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ 
verification/pdfs/Verification_2005.pdf.  “Not only were the 12-72 h[our] forecasts more 
accurate in 2005 than they had been over the previous decade, but the forecasts were 
also more skillful.”  Id. at 6. 
 7 The relief prompted by these tragedies continued well into 2006.  See e.g., 
Rev Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61 (detailing safe harbor methods for proving 
casualty losses); I.R.S. Notice 2006-67, 2006 WL 2209784 (GO Zone bonus depreciation 
calculations and examples); I.R.S. Notice 2006-56, 2006-28 I.R.B. 56 (expanded 
Hurricane Katrina relief for certain individual taxpayers). 
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damage and dilemmas confronting the insurance and 
reinsurance industries.  It then examines long-standing 
casualty tax relief measures already incorporated in the 
Internal Revenue Code (also referred to as I.R.C., Code, or tax 
code), as well as the specific ad hoc tax implications of earlier 
major national disasters.   
Part III examines the tax aftermath flowing 
immediately from Hurricane Katrina.  Part IV looks at the 
continued tax relief in response to all three major hurricanes of 
2005—Katrina, Rita and Wilma.  The Gulf Opportunity Zone 
(GO Zone) approach and disparate treatment for victims in the 
different disaster areas are also discussed in Part IV. 
The second half of the article considers these 
developments in terms of tax policy.  The author contends that 
(from a tax perspective) these 2005 catastrophes are different 
in scope only, not in kind, from other catastrophes which make 
some businesses unable to function, and damage or destroy 
individuals’ homes and property.   
Part V of the article examines which of the casualty 
relief measures ought to be expanded and enhanced for future 
victims and which should be abandoned.  The complementary 
goals of taxpayer equity and a tax code that is sufficiently 
predictable to foster desired taxpayer behavior frame the 
analysis.   
The remainder of the article focuses on specific 
proposals to improve tax treatment of casualty victims.  Along 
these lines, both procedural and substantive changes to the 
Code are proposed.  Changes beneficial to individual taxpayers, 
as well as small businesses, are emphasized.   
Part VI advocates permanent changes to the tax code 
that would automate procedural relief.  Part VII calls for a 
casualty loss credit, versus a deduction, to better aid the poor.  
Part VIII advocates relaxing constraints on retirement account 
access for all casualty victims.  Part IX proposes creation of tax 
advantaged Catastrophe Savings Accounts for individuals, 
businesses, and the insurance industry to encourage 
safeguarding against potential losses.  Part X calls for tax 
credits and relief for businesses affected by any presidentially-
declared disaster.  Part XI discusses a temporary tax credit for 
retroactive measures to make older buildings more impervious 
to weather. 
Preparation is the key to recovery for those confronted 
with unparalleled hardship.  For this reason, the author argues 
that equity and efficiency dictate a more predictable, uniform, 
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and compassionate response to all casualty victims.  
Predictability is fostered by making permanent changes to the 
tax code with incentives to motivate precautionary financial 
and tax planning.  Tax relief should complement insurance and 
other federal emergency relief measures designed to allow 
victims to rebuild their economic lives.8   
II. BACKGROUND  
A. Bad Weather Is Nothing New  
The National Hurricane Center issued more hurricane 
forecasts in the Atlantic basin in 2005 than in any previous 
year.9  Nevertheless, the United States should expect a major 
catastrophic hurricane (Category 4 or 5)10 to make landfall 
every six to seven years.11  Even weaker storm systems can 
cause tremendous flood damage.12  In North Carolina, for 
example, Category 2 hurricanes (as opposed to those much 
stronger) account for forty-two percent of all damage.13  
  
 8 While some discussion of available relief is inevitable to demonstrate how 
tax measures best complement other federal aid, a comprehensive analysis of available 
federal and state emergency relief is beyond the scope of this article.  For information 
on Federal Emergency Relief, see generally Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 and at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
Stafford Act].  See also Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal 
Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953, 958 (2005), for an excellent look at the pre-Katrina 
relationship between emergency relief and tax consequences following a disaster. 
 9 The National Hurricane Center tracks all tropical cyclones.  FRANKLIN, 
supra note 6, at 5.  A “hurricane” is the term used popularly for a strong tropical 
cyclone in the North Atlantic Ocean—similar storms are known as typhoons in the 
Northwest Pacific Ocean.  Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Lab., Hurricane 
Research Division, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/ 
A1.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).   
 10 Hurricanes are rated on the Saffir-Simpson Scale from Category 1 
(mildest; winds 74-95 mph) through Category 5 (most severe; winds greater than 155 
mph).  HURRICANE! 2006–A HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS BOOKLET 1, 7 (May 2006), 
http://vortex.accuweather.com/adc2004/pub/images/promos/florida2004/hurricane_book.
pdf.  Although Hurricane Katrina reached Category 5, it was actually lower at landfall.  
See Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/ 
KATRINA.shtml (view the links for Monday, August 29, 2005) (last visited Jan. 9, 
2007). 
 11 Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United 
States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2005 (NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-
4), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ Deadliest_Costliest.shtml (last visited  Jan. 9, 2007). 
 12 H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 1103-04 (testimony of Dr. Len Pietrafesa, North 
Carolina State University, in support of the Inland Flood Forecasting and Warning 
System Act of 2002).  
 13 Id. at 1104 (“Category 2 Hurricanes generally have a high moisture 
content and cause severe . . . flooding.”).  
2007] THE FLURRY OF TAX LAW CHANGES 803 
Mitigation measures, predominantly improved building 
codes, have helped to “harden” vulnerable property.14  However, 
the lure of the coast continues to bring more people and 
property into the areas most likely to be affected by 
hurricanes.15  Because of these predictable weather profiles and 
demonstrated demographic trends, the risks from hurricanes 
will always be present.16  
Hurricanes are only one form of natural disaster.  
Tornados, earthquakes, wild fires, blizzards, volcanoes, 
landslides, mudslides, flooding and hail storms also wreak 
havoc.  Other disasters, such as Tsunamis, could potentially 
threaten the United States, though the threat, historically, has 
been comparatively minor.17   
According to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), flooding, severe storms, and hurricanes are 
the most common and costly causes of disaster declarations in 
the United States.18  “[A]t least ten such events since 1989 have 
each required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion 
dollars.”19  However, all disasters, not just those disasters 
meriting presidential attention, leave lives in ruin and 
personal devastation for their victims.  Because these smaller 
tragedies are vastly more numerous, they continue to impact 
tens of thousands of Americans each year.20   
  
 14 See generally Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, Senior Vice President & Chief 
Economist of the Ins. Info. Inst., Presentation to the Wharton Risk Management and 
Decision Processes Center Roundtable, The Lessons of Hurricane Andrew: Is Florida 
Really Ready? (June 11, 2002), http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/ 
686021_1_0/hurricanestudy.pdf. 
 15 For example, in the past twenty-five years, “communities along the . . . 
East Coast have dramatically increased development . . . despite the knowledge that a 
hurricane or large tropical storm could cause significant damage to property and life.”  
H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 1104.  See also Ins. Info. Inst. [hereinafter I.I.I.], Hurricanes: 
Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/ hurricanes (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2007) (property values in coastal areas doubled over past decade). 
 16 Forecasters have long predicted a “damaging period of frequent storms” 
that could cost more than $110 billion if it hit New England.  H.R. REP. NO. 107-495, at 
1104.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-526, at 18, 19 (2000) (testimony in support of 
Homeowners’ Insurance Availability Act of 2000). 
 17 “[T]he frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, 
compared with other natural hazards.”  GAO, U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS: FEDERAL 
AND STATE PARTNERS COLLABORATE TO HELP COMMUNITIES REDUCE POTENTIAL 
IMPACTS, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 10, GAO-06-519 (2006).  According to 
NOAA, the last significant tsunami struck Skagway, Alaska, in 1994 causing “one 
death and $25 million in damages.”  Id. at 10-11.  
 18 Id. at 11. 
 19 Id.  
 20  Press release, American Red Cross, Survey Reveals Americans Not as 
Prepared as They Think (May 23, 2006), http://www.redcross.org/pressrelease/ 
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In the United States, catastrophic disasters causing at 
least $25 million in direct damages occur on average about 
twice a month.21  While the major hurricanes of 2005 captured 
all of the media attention, over the same timeframe, the 
American Red Cross responded to a record 72,883 disasters, 
most of them fire-related.22  “Fire kills more Americans each 
year than all other disasters combined.”23 
Whether the disaster is large or small, man-made or 
natural, if it hits you, it hurts you.  Few would argue that the 
victims of arson or terrorist attacks are any less worthy of tax 
relief than the victims of a natural disaster.  Who can forget or 
ignore the tragedy and loss of September 11, 2001?  Because 
disasters harm whomever they strike, all victims of casualty 
losses should be treated equally under the tax code. 
B. Insurance as a Safeguard  
Insurance as a means of protection against perils has 
been around for hundreds of years.24  Standard insurance for 
perils such as fires, vandalism, burglary, or theft has 
historically been available to homeowners as part of their basic 
policy coverage.25  Homeowners’ policies typically insure 
against some severe weather damage, such as wind and hail 
coverage, but the insurance against water damage from storms 
is seriously limited.26  Much of the catastrophic damage from 
  
0,1077,0_314_5398,00.html  [hereinafter “American Red Cross”] (last visited Jan. 9, 
2007). 
 21 Lipman, supra note 8, at 958 (citing I.I.I., Catastrophes: Facts and 
Statistics: Insured Losses for U.S. Catastrophes 1994-2003, http://www.iii.org/media/ 
facts/statsbyissue/catastrophes/ (last visited Jul. 3, 2004)).  The most recent data 
confirms this frequency in 2004-2006.  I.I.I., Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics: Insured 
Losses for U.S. Catastrophes 1997-2006, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/ 
catastrophes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).  
 22 American Red Cross, supra note 20. 
 23 Christina Ward, Quiet Disasters: House Fires Destroy Lives Every Day, RED 
CROSS. ORG., Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/fires/010406house 
fires.html.  See also U.S. Fire Administration, USFA National Fire Statistics, 
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/national/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).  
 24 See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 31-33 (1870) (discussing 
evolution of maritime insurance over the past ten centuries).  
 25 See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4029).  See also I.I.I., Hot Topics & Issues 
Updates, Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, (March 2007), http://www.iii.org/media/ 
hottopics/insurance/xxx [hereinafter Catastrophes: Insurance Issues] (commercial 
policies generally cover the same causes of loss, but vary somewhat based on coverage 
selected). 
 26 See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, (S.D. 
Miss. 2006) (policy precluded damage from flooding and storm surge during Hurricane 
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hurricanes results from flood damage due to the storm surge 
and heavy rains.27  Unfortunately, most policies contain an 
express “flood exclusion.”28  
Flood insurance has not been commercially available 
through the private insurance industry “[b]ecause of the high 
risks and the lack of under-writing standards.”29  Therefore, in 
1968, Congress created a voluntary National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) underwritten by the federal government.30  
Over the years, the federal government assumed responsibility 
for providing relief and for partial indemnification for property 
losses resulting from floods.31  
Historically, floods have been one of the most 
destructive national hazards facing the people of the United 
States.32  The year 2005 was no exception.  In Louisiana alone, 
Hurricane Katrina caused over $38 billion in flood and storm 
surge damage, most of it uninsured.33  Louisiana was also 
hardest hit with insured Katrina-related losses of over $24 
billion.34 
For decades, Congress has been “acutely aware of the 
national need for a reliable and comprehensive flood insurance 
  
Katrina, but covered damage caused by wind).  The I.I.I. indicates a typical 
homeowners policy contains a provision stating, “We do not pay for loss to the interior 
of a building or to personal property inside, caused by rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust 
unless the wind or hail first damages the roof or walls and the wind forces rain, snow, 
sleet, sand or dust through the opening.”  Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, Senior Vice President 
& Chief Economist of the I.I.I., Presentation, Hurricane Season of 2005: Impacts on US 
P/C Insurance Markets In 2006 & Beyond 1, 145 (Mar. 2006), http://server.iii.org/ 
yy_obj_data/binary/744085_1_0/katrina.pdf [hereinafter Hartwig, Impact of 2005 
Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets]. 
 27 For example, Hurricane Katrina damages due to storm surge and flooding 
were estimated at $44 billion, compared to $38 billion for all other property damage.  
Hartwig, Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra note 26, at 
36, 48. 
 28 Id. at 146.   
 29 S. REP. NO. 93-583 at 3219 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3217-
19. 
 30 National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 4001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001).  
See also S. REP. NO. 93-583, at 3219. 
 31 See S. REP. NO. 93-583, at 3220. 
 32 GAO, CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, 
Highlights, GAO-03-606T (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03606t.pdf. 
 33 Dr. Robert P. Hartwig, Presentation to Baton Rouge Press Club, Louisiana 
Insurance Market Overview: Beyond Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 1, 26 (May 15, 2006), 
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/754699_1_0/louisiana.pdf [hereinafter Hartwig, 
Beyond Katrina]. 
 34 Id. at 42 (includes $1.47 billion in flood-damaged vehicles covered by 
comprehensive policies).   
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program”35 because as many as ninety percent of all natural 
disasters in this country involve flooding.36  However, as 
demonstrated in 2005, Congress has yet to strike the right 
balance with the NFIP.37   
In 2006 testimony before Congress, the Comptroller 
General declared the NFIP program “essentially bankrupt.”38  
Congress agreed to a $17 billion bailout of the NFIP39 and 
began crafting legislation to improve the capacity of the 
program to deal with the most significant catastrophes.40 
The NFIP is broken for a variety of reasons.  Most who 
need flood insurance do not purchase it.41  Premiums are also 
“woefully inadequate given the technical bankruptcy of the 
NFIP.”42  Even for homeowners who do insure, because of 
subsidies, homeowners do not bear the true share of costs 
  
 35 S. REP NO. 93-583, at 3218. 
 36 GAO, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: IMPROVEMENTS 
NEEDED TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM, GAO-06-119 (2005).  See also JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX POLICY 
OPTIONS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, CONG. RES. SERVICE (C.R.S.) RL33088 (Sept. 16, 
2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53669.pdf. 
 37 GAO, FISCAL EXPOSURES: IMPROVING THE BUDGETARY FOCUS ON LONG-
TERM COSTS AND UNCERTAINTIES, GAO-03-213 (2003) (federal insurance exposes 
government to future, potentially significant, unbudgeted costs). 
 38 GAO, HURRICANE KATRINA: GAO’S PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
REGARDING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY 1, 38, GAO-06-442T (2006).  
“The magnitude and severity of the flood losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
overwhelmed the ability of the NFIP to absorb the costs of paying claims, providing an 
illustration of the extent to which the federal government is exposed to claims coverage 
in catastrophic loss years.”  Id.   
 39 National Flood Insurance Program Further Enhanced Borrowing 
Authority Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-106, 119 Stat. 2288 (Nov. 2005) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 4016(a)) (increasing maximum loan from $3.5 to 18.5 million), amending 
National Flood Insurance Program Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-65, 119 Stat. 1998 (Sept. 2005) (increasing maximum loan from $1.5 to $3.5 
million). 
 40 H.R. REP. NO. 109-410 (to accompany H.R. 4973, Flood Insurance Reform 
and Modernization Act of 2006).  As this article went to press in Spring 2007, four Bills 
addressing flood insurance issues were pending in the 110th Congress: H.R. 91, 
Homeowners Insurance Protection Act of 2007 (mandating GAO study of NFIP and 
Hurricane-Related Flooding); H.R. 920, Multiple Peril Insurance Act of 2007 
(expanding NFIP to also cover damage from hurricanes, tornados, cyclones, typhoons or 
other windstorms); H.R. 921, Flood Insurance Community Outreach Grant Program 
Act of 2007 (authorizing FEMA to make grants to poor communities to encourage flood 
insurance); H.R. 922, National Flood Insurance Program Participation Evaluation Act 
of 2007 (requiring GAO to study NFIP participation); http://www.thomas.gov (enter 
“flood insurance”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). 
 41 “More than 11 million U.S. homes are in flood zones,” but “[o]nly about one 
in four homeowners who live in areas vulnerable to floods purchase federal flood 
insurance.”  Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25.  
 42 Hartwig, Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra 
note 26, at 138. 
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associated with their risks.43  In this regard, subsidies, like 
federal emergency relief itself, could actually stimulate 
overdevelopment of risky areas.44   
For property damage covered by private insurance, 
eight of the ten most costly catastrophes in the history of the 
United States were the result of hurricane activity.45  The 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack was the only man-made 
disaster of similar magnitude.46  The Northridge, California 
earthquake of 1994 rounds out the list.47  Notably, seven of the 
ten most costly hurricanes occurred in 2004-2005.48 
  
 43 DR. L. JAMES VALVERDE, JR., DIRECTOR, ECONOMICS, AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT, I.I.I., MANAGING NATURAL DISASTER RISK: WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PLAY? 1, 5 (Jan. 2006), http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/ 
749407_1_0/Disaster_Risk.pdf (“[F]ederal insurance programs are rarely actuarially 
sound”). 
 44 See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25.  See also Hartwig, 
Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra note 26, at 15, 57.  
“Overdevelopment of high risk areas is encouraged by public subsidies, as are 
catastrophe losses that people fail to mitigate and insure.”  Homeowners Insurance 
Availability in Disaster Prone Areas: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community Opportunity, 105th Cong. 33 (1997) (statement of Dr. Robert 
W. Klein, Dir. of Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. and Ins. Res., Georgia State Univ.), 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba41548.000/ hba41548_0.HTM#0. 
 45 I.I.I., Catastrophes: Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/ 
statsbyissue/catastrophes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 46 It was the worst in terms of fatalities (2976), and property losses exceeded 
$20 billion.  Id. 
 47 In 2006 dollars, damage is estimated at $18-27 billion.  I.I.I., Earthquakes: 
Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/earthquakes/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 48 In 2007, the Insurance Information Institute published the following data 
on its website: 
The Ten Most Costly Hurricanes in the United States ($ Millions) 
  Estimated insured loss (1) 
Rank Hurricane Dollars when occurred In 2006 dollars (2) 
1 Katrina (2005) $40,600 $41,910 
2 Andrew (1992) 15,500 22,272 
3 Wilma (2005) 10,300 10,632 
4 Charley (2004) 7,475 7,978  
5 Ivan (2004) 7,110 7,588 
6 Hugo (1989) 4,195 6,820 
7 Rita (2005) 5,627 5,809  
8 Frances (2004) 4,595 4,904 
9 Jeanne (2004) 3,440 3,671 
10 Georges (1998) 2,900 3,587 
(1) Property coverage only. 
(2) Adjusted to 2006 dollars by the Insurance Information Institute. 
Source: ISO; Insurance Institute 
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Due to insured losses hitting record proportions, 
Congress began considering federalizing reinsurance of the 
hurricane insurance market.49  Despite the fact that many in 
the private insurance industry are opposed to such 
federalization (citing ability to withstand the highest loss years 
on record with sufficient policy reserves),50 there is open debate 
in the industry about the need for federal reinsurance.51  As the 
debate over how to structure catastrophic insurance lingers, no 
one disputes the need for homeowners to have access to 
affordable insurance. 
Currently, fifty-nine percent of homeowners are 
uninsured or underinsured.52  With the real estate boom of the 
early twenty-first century, most home owners in coastal areas 
could find themselves woefully underinsured.  Regardless of 
whether the government or private industry offers insurance, 
tax relief measures should serve as incentives for people to 
carry adequate insurance.53  
In summary, while individuals can affordably insure 
against most perils with their property coverage carrier, some 
risks may be so unpredictable and of such great magnitude as 
to be beyond the scope of typical private insurance.54  
Supplemental major catastrophe insurance (flood insurance, 
earthquake insurance, and, perhaps in the near future, 
hurricane insurance or other “mega-catastrophe” policies) must 
  
I.I.I., Hurricanes: Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/ 
hurricanes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 49 See, e.g., H.R. 846, 109th Cong. (2005) (federal auctions of catastrophe 
reinsurance contracts); H.R. 4366, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4507, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(allowing States with catastrophe insurance programs to purchase federal 
reinsurance).  
 50 See generally Is America’s Housing Market Prepared for the Next Natural 
Catastrophe: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community 
Opportunity 109th Cong. (June 28, 2006) (statement of Dennis C. Burke, Vice 
President of State Relations, Reinsurance Assoc. of Am.), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/062806dcb.pdf.  
 51 VALVERDE, supra note 43, at 4-5.  See also Is America’s Housing Market 
Prepared for the Next Natural Catastrophe: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community Opportunity 109th Cong. (June 28, 2006) (statement of Alex 
Soto, on Behalf of the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/062806as.pdf (lack of insurance industry 
consensus hampering pending legislation). 
 52 Hartwig, Beyond Katrina, supra note 33, at 110 (although the numbers 
have improved in the past few years, most homes are still undervalued by 22%). 
 53 Indeed, one of the goals of the Stafford Act is “encouraging individuals, 
States, and local governments to protect themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to 
supplement or replace governmental assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4) (2000). 
 54 VALVERDE, supra note 43, at 3.  
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be separately obtained.  Regrettably, too few Americans secure 
this additional coverage.55 
As discussed in the next two sections, tax relief for 
victims of disaster is a relatively new phenomenon.  Congress 
must take care that such relief encourages prudent decisions 
(such as motivating individuals to obtain sufficient insurance—
including flood insurance for those at risk), versus exacerbating 
a false sense of security that a government bailout could 
promote.56   
C. Tax Relief for Victims of All Casualties  
With any hurricane or other substantial disaster, 
property is lost and residents are often displaced from their 
homes and possibly their jobs.  Some victims receive 
government or charitable aid in the form of food, shelter, or 
even outright cash.57  In addition to the turmoil of the 
moment—safeguarding family members and trying to put their 
lives back together—taxpayers may be confronted with lost or 
destroyed records.  Paying their taxes may be the last thing on 
their minds. 
Fortunately, the federal government has historically 
afforded some relief to victims of all casualties.58  The principal 
provision allowing compensation for property loss is Code 
Section 165, which allows a tax deduction for casualty losses.59  
In addition to losses due to storms, the Code allows relief for 
fires, shipwreck, theft, or other casualties.60  Section 165 
extends broadly to those suffering a great variety of casualty 
losses; entitlement to this deduction is independent of any 
  
 55 For example, it is estimated by the insurance industry that “[o]nly 13% of 
[California] homeowners buy earthquake insurance.” Hartwig, Beyond Katrina, supra 
note 33, at 67. 
 56 See Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25 (illustrating that the 
damage Katrina caused “has triggered a reexamination . . . of how the United States 
deals with the financial consequences of such massive property damage and personal 
loss”). 
 57 See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 1. 
 58 For an excellent discussion of the pre-2005 tax treatment of disasters, see 
Lipman, supra note 8. 
 59 I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2006).  All sections of the Internal Revenue Code 
(“I.R.C.” or “Code”) are codified in Title 26 of the U.S. Code.  All references to the Code 
are current as of March 2007. 
 60 For individuals, deductible losses must be incurred in a trade or business, 
derive from some other profit-seeking activity, or, except as provided in subsection (h), 
arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, theft, or other casualty.  I.R.C. § 165(c). 
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nationally declared emergency.61  A disadvantage is that it is 
only available to taxpayers who itemize and is subject to other 
limitations reducing its efficacy.  The drawbacks of Section 165 
are discussed in more detail in Part VII, infra.62 
The IRS has long recognized that government payments 
to individuals on the basis of need also promote the public 
welfare.63  Despite the statutory presumption that (unless 
otherwise excluded) all accessions to wealth constitute income 
pursuant to Section 61 of the Code, the IRS has acknowledged 
that welfare payments need not be reported as income.64  Note 
that unemployment compensation is a replacement for income 
versus a welfare payment, and thus remains taxable.65 
Disaster relief is a type of welfare payment, because it 
helps individuals and families who are put in need based on 
the emergency confronting them.66  “The assistance that a 
government grants its citizens who sustain personal injury and 
property damage as the result of hurricanes, tornadoes, 
earthquakes, and other natural disasters is motivated by its 
obligation to assist in alleviating the suffering and damage 
caused by the disaster.”67   
The “need” for the welfare is established by the 
emergency circumstances prompting the disaster relief and is 
independent of the taxpayer’s income.68  After the terrorist 
bombings of September 11, 2001, Code Section 139 was 
promulgated to codify that recipients are not taxed on qualified 
disaster relief payments.69  Further, reimbursements paid by 
  
 61 But see id. § 165(i) (timing advantage in declared emergency). 
 62 See notes 354-78 and accompanying text. 
 63 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (social benefit program 
payments not includible in income).  Note, emergency grants to businesses are not tax 
exempt.  Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B. 120.   
 64 Rev. Rul. 74-205, supra note 63.  See also I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, 2002-2 
C.B. 917, Questions and Answers: Q-1–A-2, (tax-exempt grants following Sept. 11, 
2001). 
 65 I.R.C. § 85; Rev. Rul. 79-299, 1979-2 C.B. 32. 
 66 Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (disaster relief in interest of general 
welfare—not income); Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (relocation payments for 
moving from flood-damaged residence not taxable).  
 67 Rev. Rul. 76-144, supra note 66. 
 68 I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, supra note 64 (Nonessential, decorative, and luxury 
items fall outside the gambit of necessary disaster-related expenses.). 
 69 I.R.C. § 139 (Qualified disasters include presidentially-declared disasters, 
disasters from terrorist or military activity, disasters resulting from accidents 
involving common carriers, or other events determined by the Secretary to be 
catastrophic. Amounts paid by federal, state, or local governments determined to 
warrant assistance are also not taxable.).  The general welfare policy was codified, but 
not supplanted by I.R.C. § 139.  See I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, supra note 64. 
2007] THE FLURRY OF TAX LAW CHANGES 811 
state agencies, charities, or employers, for expenses incurred by 
those assisting in emergency relief efforts, are likewise 
excluded from gross income.70  
There is more flexibility in the tax code for victims of 
presidentially-declared disasters than for victims of other 
casualties.71  Section 165(i) allows victims of presidentially-
declared disasters an election to take the deduction for casualty 
losses in the immediately preceding tax year.72   
The benefit of the preference is two-fold.  Allowing the 
option to choose the year to take the deduction allows the 
taxpayer the benefit of selecting whatever tax year yields a 
better result (the earlier tax year may well reflect greater 
income due to the lack of catastrophic interruption—therefore 
relief for the earlier period may well be from a higher marginal 
tax rate).  Even where the amount would be identical, making 
the election affords earlier tax relief for the loss.   
The Code also allows other advantages for victims of 
presidentially-declared tragedies.73  For example, Code Section 
7508A allows the Secretary of the Treasury discretion to 
disregard deadlines for filing and payment of taxes in declared 
disaster areas.74  It states: “In the case of a taxpayer 
determined by the Secretary to be affected by a Presidentially 
declared disaster . . . the Secretary may specify a period of up to 
1 year that may be disregarded in determining . . . [whether 
filing or payment of tax]75 were performed within the time 
  
 70 Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283. 
 71 “Declared” is used throughout as an equivalent to “presidentially-
declared.”  Both relate to areas declared by the President to be National Disaster Areas 
pursuant to § 401 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. § 5170). 
 72 I.R.C. § 165(i)(1) (The election is irrevocable after ninety days).  Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.165-11 (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.165-11).  All sections of the Treasury Regulations 
are codified in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulation and are current as of March 
2007. 
 73 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1033(h) (favorable treatment of insurance proceeds and 
doubling of time to replace involuntarily converted property).  See infra notes 99-105 
and accompanying text. 
 74 I.R.C. § 7508A. 
 75 I.R.C. § 7508(a) allows the following relief: 
(A) Filing any return of income, estate, gift, employment, or excise tax; 
(B) Payment of any income, estate, gift, employment, or excise tax or any 
installment thereof or of any other liability to the United States in respect 
thereof; 
(C) Filing a petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of a deficiency, or 
for review of a decision rendered by the Tax Court; 
(D) Allowance of a credit or refund of any tax; 
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prescribed . . . the amount of any interest, penalty, additional 
amount, or addition to the tax . . . [and] the amount of any 
credit or refund.”76   
When the Secretary has not exercised this discretion or 
when the taxpayer fails to qualify as an “affected taxpayer” in 
the declared disaster region, the IRS will consider extensions 
and abatement of late payment penalties on a case-by-case 
basis.77  Code Sections 6081 and 6161 allow the Secretary 
discretion to extend deadlines for a reasonable time not to 
exceed six months.78 
D. Tax Relief for Specific Disasters  
Some victims of particular disasters have been granted 
additional tax relief.  The following sections detail tax relief 
afforded to the victims of some noteworthy recent disasters.  
The discussion is not exhaustive, but illustrates representative 
responses to major disasters, as well as the trend toward 
increased emphasis on tax relief.  It is appropriate to examine 
previous assistance to gauge how tax relief could best be used 
in the future. 
  
(E) Filing a claim for credit or refund of any tax; 
(F) Bringing suit upon any such claim for credit or refund; 
(G) Assessment of any tax; 
(H) Giving or making any notice or demand for the payment of any tax, or 
with respect to any liability to the United States in respect of any tax; 
(I) Collection, by the Secretary, by levy or otherwise, of the amount of any 
liability in respect of any tax; 
(J) Bringing suit by the United States, or any officer on its behalf, in respect 
of any liability in respect of any tax; and 
(K) Any other act required or permitted under the internal revenue laws 
specified by the Secretary[.] 
Id. 
 76 I.R.C. § 7508A (emphasis added). 
 77 Internal Revenue Manual 25.16.1.1 (2003).  For example, if a taxpayer 
arranged for a loan to pay taxes due on his business, but the bank scheduled to close on 
the loan was not open due to severe damages, the IRS would consider abatement “using 
reasonable cause criteria.”  Id. 
 78 I.R.C. §§ 6081, 6161. 
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1. Hurricane Hugo (1989) 
Although no legislative tax relief was provided to the 
victims of Hurricane Hugo, the IRS afforded victims some 
procedural as well as substantive relief.  For example, 
taxpayers in disaster areas were granted extensions of time to 
file and pay taxes where the deadlines were otherwise 
imminent.79   
Further, for those taxpayers who had already received 
six-month extensions (so that Sections 6081 and 6161 
precluded further extensions), the Secretary determined 
categorically that these affected taxpayers were deemed to 
have reasonable cause for late filing so that late filing penalties 
would automatically be waived, so long as returns were 
postmarked and payment made before the extended date.80  
Taxpayers were directed to flag the return for special handling 
by marking “HUGO” on the top center of the return.81  
Taxpayers with addresses outside the designated disaster area 
were told they “should also include a brief statement as to how 
Hugo affected them.”82 
Congress provided cost-sharing assistance to the victims 
of Hurricane Hugo for the purposes of encouraging tree owners 
to reestablish stands of trees.83  The Secretary of Agriculture 
was charged to develop and implement a program to provide 
financial assistance to owners of private timber stands 
damaged in 1989 by Hurricane Hugo.84  The assistance was 
only for those living in counties declared by the president to be 
Hurricane Hugo disaster areas and those living in contiguous 
counties.85  The law created a benefit of up to $50,000 based 
upon a federal cost-share (including labor) of seventy-five 
percent of total cost to the victim.86  
  
 79 I.R.S. Notice 89-136, 1989-2 C.B. 451-52. 
 80 Id. (waiving penalties under I.R.C. § 6651 and noting that statutory 
interest could not be waived).  See also I.R.S. Notice 89-107, 1989-2 C.B. 445 
(considering “taxpayers affected by Hurricane Hugo as having reasonable cause for late 
filing” and payment of excise taxes related to pension and employee benefit plans). 
 81 I.R.S. Notice 89-107, supra note 80. 
 82 Id.  
 83 Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2235(b), 104 Stat. 3359, 3960 (1990). 
 84 Id. at 3960. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. at 3961.  
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Congress also authorized $65 million to help persons 
engaged in commercial fisheries.87  This relief was much more 
flexible and included direct relief to victims as well as indirect 
relief through States and local governments and nonprofit 
organizations, “for measures to alleviate harm incurred as a 
direct result of a fishery resource disaster.”88  The relief was not 
limited to Hurricane Hugo disaster areas, but also included 
damages arising from later hurricanes (specifically, Andrew 
and Iniki), “or any other natural disaster.”89  Such relief was 
“first-come, first-serve” since amounts appropriated were only 
available until expended.90 
While Congress used both of the aforementioned 
measures to afford targeted relief to challenged business 
sectors, neither employed the tax code as the means to 
effectuate this relief.   
2. Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (1992) 
Hurricane Andrew caused $15.5 billion in insured 
damage (over $20 billion in 2006 dollars) and was the costliest 
natural disaster in U.S. history before Hurricane Katrina.91  
“With peak wind gusts of almost 200 mph, the hurricane 
flattened whole communities”, destroying thousands of homes 
and businesses, battering crops, and “leaving in its wake a 
wasteland of debris.”92  Within weeks, Typhoon Omar struck 
the tiny Island of Guam and Hurricane Iniki roared across 
Hawaii, the worst hurricane to hit the Hawaiian Islands in a 
century.93  
In addition to the aid to commercial fisheries discussed 
above, Congress authorized federal agencies to “accept gifts of 
property, money, or anything else of value.”94  The new law 
directed agencies to “establish written procedures to implement 
this program” and authorized agencies to accept gifts 
designated for individual employees.95  It allowed donations 
  
 87 Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9135, 106 Stat. 1876 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
4107 (d)(1) (2000)). 
 88 16 U.S.C. § 4107(d)(1) (2000). 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. 
 91 Hurricane Facts and Statistics, supra note 48.  
 92 Id.  
 93 See Proclamation No. 6491, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,553 (Oct. 14, 1992).  
 94 Pub. L. No. 102-368, § 901, 106 Stat. 1117, 1156 (1992). 
 95 Id.  
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“from non-Federal sources for extraordinary and unanticipated 
expenses incurred by agency employees in their personal 
capacity within the areas designated as [national] disaster 
areas.”96   
The Congress also provided explicit tax relief to these 
disaster victims.97  It retroactively afforded relief to victims of 
presidentially-declared disasters after September 1, 1991.98  
Significantly, the new law afforded victims of declared 
emergencies four years (versus two years) to replace their home 
and its scheduled contents without recognizing a taxable gain.99  
Congress also created tax advantages for insured individuals to 
the extent their principal residence and its contents were 
destroyed (involuntarily converted) as a result of a declared 
disaster.100   
Specifically, the law allowed an exclusion from income 
of any and all gain from insurance proceeds paid on 
involuntarily converted personal property that was not 
identified on a specific insurance schedule.101  Most household 
goods—furniture, clothing, appliances, foodstocks, etc.—qualify 
for this special tax treatment.102  Furthermore, the law 
generously provided that all other insurance proceeds would be 
treated as a single item in calculating nonrecognition of gain.103   
In a subsequent Revenue Ruling, the Service 
determined that all costs to replace a qualifying victim’s house, 
plus its scheduled and unscheduled contents, would be 
compared with the lump sum insurance proceeds from the 
converted house and scheduled converted property only 
(thereby excluding the entire recovery for unscheduled 
property from the gain calculation).104  In that case, the 
taxpayer, who had received $300x insurance on his house, $10x 
in scheduled proceeds, and $35x in unscheduled proceeds, 
  
 96 Id.  
 97 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13431, 
107 Stat. 312, 567 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1033(h) (2005)). 
 98 Id. § 13431(b). This benefit would include victims of Hurricanes Andrew 
and Iniki, Typhoon Omar, any other declared disasters occurring in 1992, and all 
subsequent disasters.  
 99 I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(B). 
 100 Id. § 1033(h)(1)(A). 
 101 Typically only high value items, such as jewelry, furs, silverware, or 
collectibles are scheduled.  See generally Rev. Rul. 95-22, 1995-12 I.R.B. 4. 
 102 Id.  
 103 I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii). 
 104 Rev. Rul. 95-22, supra note 101. 
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needed to spend only $310x to purchase a replacement dwelling 
and all of its contents.105     
The IRS was even more active in 1992 than it was after 
Hurricane Hugo.  Like the 1989 relief, the IRS granted 
extensions of time to file and pay taxes up to the maximum 
permissible leeway under Code Section 6081 and waived late 
payment penalties under Code Section 6651(a)(2).106  Taxpayers 
were directed to flag the return for special handling by 
marking “ANDREW”107 or “INIKI” on the top center of the 
return.108  Taxpayers with addresses outside the designated 
disaster area were told they “should also include a brief 
statement as to how the disaster adversely affected their 
ability to meet their tax obligations.”109  The IRS also afforded a 
new type of relief:  it suspended for thirty days all normal 
collection and examination actions for affected taxpayers in the 
disaster areas.110 
In addition to this individual relief, the IRS announced 
that it would expedite review of applications for tax exempt 
status by groups newly formed to aid the disaster victims.111  It 
also indicated it would not raise issues concerning approved 
charitable organizations that might otherwise affect an 
organization’s qualification for tax exempt status—such as an 
organization rendering assistance in good faith to its own 
employees who were victims of the disasters.112  Finally, for 
designated counties and parishes impacted by Hurricane 
Andrew, the IRS provided relief from certain low income 
housing credit requirements.113 
  
 105 Id.  
 106 I.R.S. Notice 92-40, 1992-2 C.B. 371; I.R.S. Notice 92-44, 1992-2 C.B. 373. 
 107 I.R.S. Notice 92-40, supra note 106. 
 108 I.R.S. Notice 92-44, supra note 106. 
 109 I.R.S. Notice 92-40, supra note 106; I.R.S. Notice 92-44, supra note 106. 
 110 I.R.S. News Release IR-92-88 (Aug. 28, 1992); I.R.S. News Release IR-92-
91 (Sept. 16, 1992). 
 111 I.R.S. Announcement 92-128, 1992-38 I.R.B. 42 (Sept. 8, 1992); I.R.S. 
Announcement 92-140, 1992-41 I.R.B. 75 (Sept. 24, 1992).  
 112 I.R.S. Notice 92-45, 1992-2 C.B. 375. 
 113 I.R.S. Notice 92-43, 1992-2 C.B. 373 (authorizing relief from carryover 
allocations under I.R.C. § 42(h)(1)(E) and recapture under § 42(j)(4)(E)). 
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3. Northridge (Los Angeles) Earthquake (1994) 
The Northridge Earthquake was the second most costly 
U.S. natural disaster before Hurricane Katrina.114  Measuring 
6.8 on the Richter scale, the quake “jolted the San Fernando 
Valley, 20 miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles, on 
January 17, 1994.”115  The Northridge earthquake caused more 
than sixty deaths and 12,000 injuries.116  It destroyed 8,000 
homes and damaged more than 114,000 buildings.117  According 
to the Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS), it 
caused $15.3 billion in insured losses.118  
The Congress provided no tax relief to the disaster 
victims.  The IRS relief was similar to, but less extensive than, 
the relief to the 1992 hurricane victims.  Like the earlier relief, 
the IRS granted extensions of time to file and pay taxes, but 
the extension was only for ten calendar days.119  The IRS also 
suspended normal collection and examination actions for two 
weeks (versus thirty days for affected taxpayers in the 1992 
hurricane disaster areas).120  Finally, the IRS announced that it 
would expedite review of applications for tax exempt status by 
groups newly formed to aid the disaster victims, and it would 
not raise certain issues concerning charitable organizations 
that might affect an organization’s tax exempt status.121   
Following Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Iniki, and the 
Northridge Earthquake, the states of Florida, California, and 
Hawaii intervened to prevent a near total collapse in their 
respective homeowners’ insurance markets.122  Perhaps these 
state bail-outs averted the need for serious discussion of federal 
  
 114 Hartwig, Impact of 2005 Hurricanes on US P/C Insurance Markets, supra 
note 26, at 13. 
 115 Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 I.R.S. News Release 1994 WL 14750 (Jan. 19, 1994) (IRS Offices to Provide 
Disaster Tax Assistance).  Taxpayers were directed to mark the return “LA 
EARTHQUAKE.”  Id. 
 120 I.R.S. News Release IR-92-88, supra note 110; I.R.S. News Release IR-92-
91, supra note 110; I.R.S. News Release 1994 WL 14750, supra note 119. 
 121 I.R.S. Notice 1994-7 I.R.B. 54, 1994-1 C.B. 337.  
 122 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-526.  Other risk-prone states lacking state 
insurance programs saw applications to state FAIR (Fair Access Insurance 
Requirements) plans and beach plans (markets of last resort for homeowners’ 
insurance which generally provide less coverage at a greater price) “increase 
dramatically during the last half of the 1990s.”  Id. 
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tax relief.  In any event, other than the limited relief discussed 
above, no tax relief was spawned by these mighty tragedies.123 
4. September 11, 2001—Tax Relief and Creation of the 
Liberty Zone 
Although not much tax relief had been provided to 
victims of natural disasters, the Congress was quick to pass 
legislation in the form of federal tax relief for the victims of 
9/11.  The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001124 
granted the victims of these atrocities substantial tax relief, 
including (among other things): relief from income taxes (at a 
minimum, $10,000);125 exclusion of certain death benefits;126 
estate tax reduction;127 exclusion of disaster relief payments;128 
and exclusion of certain cancellations of indebtedness.129  It also 
allowed payments by charitable organizations to be treated as 
exempt payments.130  Finally, the Act delegated authority to the 
IRS to postpone certain deadlines for up to one year in cases of 
natural disaster, and both military and terrorist attacks.131   
  
 123 Perhaps the most notable byproduct of Hurricane Andrew was the call for 
better building codes and better enforcement of existing codes.  Catastrophes: 
Insurance Issues, supra note 25, at 19. 
 124 Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 
2427 (2002) (codified as amended at scattered sections of the I.R.C.). 
 125 Id. at § 101 (codified at I.R.C. § 692).  The IRS allowed full abatement of all 
tax liability for tax years 2000 and 2001 for victims killed in the attacks.  I.R.S. News 
Release IR-2002-07 (Jan. 23, 2002).  At the same time, the IRS forgave the tax liability 
for 1994 and 1995 for the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing.  Id.  
 126 Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 102, 115 Stat. at 2429 
(codified at I.R.C. § 101).   
 127 Id. § 103 (codified at I.R.C. § 2201).  
 128 Id. § 104 (codified at I.R.C. § 139).  I.R.C. § 139(b)(4) codifies the general 
welfare exclusion for qualified disaster relief payments to individuals.  I.R.S. Notice 
2002-76, 2002-2 C.B. 917.  Because of extraordinary circumstances surrounding such 
disasters, the IRS anticipates that individuals will not be required to account for actual 
expenses so long as the amount of relief is commensurate with the anticipated 
expenses incurred.  Id. 
 129 Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 105, 115 Stat. at 2432 
(codified at I.R.C. § 108). 
 130 Id. § 104 (codified at I.R.C. § 501). 
 131 Id. § 112 (codified at I.R.C. § 7508A). 
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The tax benefits for the New York Liberty Zone132 also 
included substantial tax advantages for Liberty Zone 
businesses:  employment credits;133 bonus and accelerated 
depreciation and increased expensing for qualified Liberty Zone 
property;134 tax exempt bond advantages;135 and an extension 
from two to five years for nonrecognition of gains for property 
involuntarily converted (where replacement property is in the 
Liberty Zone).136  Some of the tax advantages for individuals 
and businesses foreshadowed a similar Congressional response 
to the massive 2005 hurricane disasters. 
As might be expected, the IRS granted extensions of 
time to file tax returns.137  Unlike the extensions discussed 
above, however, which preceded enactment of Code Section 
7508A, the IRS took full advantage of its discretion by coupling 
its ability to disregard time under Section 7508A with its 
ability to extend the deadlines for filing and payment under 
Sections 6081 and 6161.138  Under the then existing state of the 
law, Section 7508A allowed 120 days to be disregarded, which 
the IRS allowed to run consecutively with a six month 
extension for all affected taxpayers.139  The IRS later clarified 
that interest, as well as penalties, would be waived.140 
The term “affected taxpayers” was also broadly 
construed to include all victims on the four commercial 
hijacked aircraft or on the ground during the crashes; all 
workers assisting in relief efforts, regardless of whether 
  
 132  “‘New York Liberty Zone’ means the area located on or south of Canal 
Street, East Broadway (east of its intersection with Canal Street), or Grand Street 
(east of its intersection with East Broadway) in the Borough of Manhattan in the City 
of New York, New York.”  I.R.C. § 1400L(h).  Liberty Zone businesses are those 
employing no more than 200 employees which rebuilt in the footprint of the terrorist 
bombings of Sept. 11, 2001 (commonly thought of as ground zero) as well as any 
businesses damaged or destroyed by the attacks that relocated anywhere else within 
New York City.  I.R.C. § 1400L(a)(2)(C), (h).   
 133 See I.R.C. § 51. 
 134 See I.R.C. § 168(k)(2). 
 135 See I.R.C. § 1400L(d), (e). 
 136 These business advantages are codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 1400L. 
 137 I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. 305. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Id.  See also Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 38, 149 (increasing maximum relief from 90 to 
120 days).  Earlier in 2001, in response to the New Mexico wildfires, the IRS had 
similarly construed its § 7508A authority to run consecutively (versus concurrently) 
with its extension authorities under §§ 6081 and 6161. I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1 
C.B. 989. 
 140 I.R.S. Notice 2002-40, 2002-1 C.B. 1152 (based on new authority from 
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001). 
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affiliated with a recognized government or philanthropic relief 
organization; and all those who work (or used to work) in the 
declared disaster area.141  In addition, taxpayers experiencing 
transportation or mail or delivery service disturbances 
resulting from the terrorist attacks were afforded an extension 
until November 15, 2001.142 
In terms of relief to helping organizations, the IRS 
again agreed to expedite tax-exempt status requests.143  The 
IRS also agreed to treat any payments made in good faith to 
the victims or their surviving family members as “related to 
the charity’s exempt purpose,” so long as the payments were 
made using objective standards.144 [This relief presumably 
overcomes the necessity of showing that the recipients are 
“needy,” consistent with the purpose for which many charitable 
organization exemptions have been approved (for example the 
Salvation Army), and also allows charities to overcome the 
501(c)(3) prohibition that an organization be operated 
exclusively for public purpose and that no part of the benefits 
inure to any private individual].145 
5. Hurricanes Ivan, Charley, Frances, and Jeanne (2004) 
While the 2004 hurricane season was, at that time, the 
most expensive ever,146 the widespread loss did not lead to any 
federal legislative tax relief.  However, the IRS exercised its 
discretion to grant relief for several declared disasters, 
including Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, and 
Tropical Storm Bonnie.147  The IRS granted extensions of time 
to file and pay taxes;148 relief from deadlines involved in Section 
1031 like-kind exchange transactions;149 and, a suspension of 
  
 141 I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, supra note 137. 
 142 Id. 
 143 I.R.S. News Release IR-2001-82 (Sept. 18, 2001). 
 144 I.R.S. Notice 2001-78, 2001-2 C.B. 576. 
 145 See generally S. REP. NO. 107-211, at 53-54 (2002) (proposed CARE Act of 
2002, payments by charitable organizations to victims of war on terrorism). 
 146 Blake et al., supra note 11. 
 147 See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-108 (Aug. 16, 2004) (extending time 
to file and pay taxes for areas affected by Bonnie and Charley); I.R.S. News Release IR-
2004-115 (Sept. 10, 2004) (extending time to file and pay taxes for Hurricane Frances); 
I.R.S. Notice 2004-62, 2004-2 C.B. 565 (additional relief for areas affected by Bonnie, 
Charley, and Frances); I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, 2004-2 C.B. 878 (relief from certain 
requirements due to  Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne). 
 148 I.R.S. News Releases IR-2004-108 and IR-2004-115, supra note 147; I.R.S. 
News Release IR-2004-118 (Sept. 22, 2004). 
 149 I.R.S. Notice 2005-3, 2005-1 C.B. 447.  
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the income limitations (ordinarily required for occupants of 
low-income housing) to allow landlords of such property to 
provide temporary lodging to individuals displaced by 
Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.150  
In Florida, after the devastating 2004 hurricane season, 
the notion of a hurricane savings account was first 
introduced.151  The hurricane savings account was forecast “to 
cover an insurance deductible or other uninsured portion of the 
risks of loss from a hurricane, rising flood waters, or other 
catastrophic windstorm event.”152  Because they would only be 
created to safeguard homesteads, the accounts would be beyond 
the reach of creditors.153  However, benefits of such an account 
are not realized unless or until the federal government creates 
such a tax-exempt or tax-deferred savings vehicle.154 
III. HURRICANE KATRINA AND ITS TAX AFTERMATH 
A. The IRS Response  
The IRS response to Hurricane Katrina was swift and 
sustained.  Within days of the disaster, the IRS Commissioner, 
Mark Everson, announced deadline extensions to those with 
taxes otherwise coming due.155  Through Everson, the IRS 
pledged, “We will do everything we can to help taxpayers, 
business and tax professionals while ensuring the smooth 
continuity of our nation’s tax system.”156  In the following thirty 
  
 150 I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; see also I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, 2004-
2 C.B. 875 (relief in Alabama due to Ivan); I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, 2004-2 C.B. 876 
(relief in Ohio due to post-hurricane severe storms and flooding). 
 151 Florida Staff Analysis, S.B. 660 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at Westlaw (Find 
by Citation: Florida Staff Analysis, S.B. 660; Florida Staff Analysis, S.B. 660, 2/8/2005). 
 152 Florida Senate Journal, 2005 Reg. Sess., No. 14 (Apr. 13, 2005), available 
at Westlaw (Find by Citation: FL S. Jour., 2005 Reg. Sess., No. 14; run search). 
 153 FLA. STAT. § 222.22 (2006).  This statute exempts hurricane savings 
accounts and other preferred savings programs from legal process.  However, this 
benefit attaches only when “the federal government provides tax-exempt or tax-
deferred status to a hurricane savings account.”  Id.  § 222.22(4)(c).  
 154 Id. § 222.22.  Although the federal government has not yet created such a 
favored tax position, Florida’s congressional delegation has filed legislation in Congress 
which would give hurricane savings accounts preferential tax treatment.  See H.R. 
4836, 109th Cong. (2006).  Benefits of such an account are discussed in Part IX, infra. 
 155 I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-84 (Aug. 30, 2005).  Note that relief was 
further extended to February 28, 2006, by direction of Congress.  See infra note 221 
and accompanying text. 
 156 Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, I.R.S., Treasury Press Conference on 
Hurricane Tax Relief (Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=147372,00.html (Prepared Remarks to Accompany IR-2005-96). 
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days, the IRS kept its promise, issuing twenty-nine News 
Releases, Announcements, and Notices extending relief.157   
The immediate relief in the wake of the hurricane was 
timely and essential, because many important books and 
records had been lost or destroyed due to the widespread 
devastation and massive flooding.158  In addition, where records 
miraculously survived, those who were evacuated often had no 
immediate access to them.159   
B. Legislative Response  
The House and Senate were quick to rally to support 
relief of the hurricane victims.  House Resolution 3768 was 
passed on September 15, 2005 and contained a number of tax 
relief measures: 1) lifting a three-year requirement for 
mortgage revenue bonds; 2) allowing persons providing housing 
to dislocated persons an additional deduction (exemption) of 
$500 for each dislocated person housed; 3) exempting 
forgiveness of indebtedness from income; 4) allowing expanded 
work opportunity tax credits to employers in the disaster area; 
5) enabling persons to access individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs) or pension accounts without tax penalty (and with an 
opportunity to reinvest as if the money were rolled over); and, 
most significantly,  6) eliminating the ten percent Adjusted 
Gross Income (AGI) threshold and $100 reduction from the 
casualty loss deduction.160 
A similar Senate Bill, S. 1696, was passed on the same 
date, but was later vitiated by Senate passage of H.R. 3768, as 
amended by the Senate.161  The original Senate Bill differed in 
  
 157 The count is derived from a Westlaw search of the Federal Taxation – IRS 
Cumulative Bulletins and Federal Tax–IRS News Releases databases from Aug. 30 to 
Sept. 29, 2005 (enter “Hurricane Katrina” as the search term).  
 158 See Rodney C. Runyan, Small Business in the Face of Crisis: Identifying 
Barriers to Recovery from a Natural Disaster, 14 J. OF CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 
12 (2006). 
 159 Id. at 13. 
 160 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the House bill to cost over 
$5.2 billion, with the casualty loss deduction the single largest item at over $2.4 billion. 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 3768, Doc. No. JCX-
65-05 R,  (Sept. 15, 2005) [hereinafter JCX-65-05].  
 161 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 3768, THE 
“KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005,” Doc. No. JCX-69-05 As Passed by the 
House and the Senate on September 21, 2005, at 1 (Sept. 22, 2005) [hereinafter JCX-69-
05]. 
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that it also included a forty percent tax credit162 for employers 
of retained workers, included an enhanced deduction for food163 
and book164 donations, and mandated an extension of tax filing 
deadlines.165  These provisions were carried forward in the 
amended version of H.R. 3768.  Provisions in S. 1696 “dealing 
with IRS information sharing and taxpayer assistance . . . were 
dropped in the compromise.”166   
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) 
was signed by President Bush and became law on September 
23, 2005.167  It captured the proposed tax relief contained in 
H.R. 3768 as amended by the Senate.168  KETRA Title I creates 
special rules for using retirement funds.  Title II allows 
employment relief.  Title III contains incentives for charity.  
The final Title creates miscellaneous additional benefits.  
These benefits are discussed in detail in the sections that 
follow.  The price tag for KETRA in foregone revenue is 
estimated at $6.1 billion.169 
1. Retirement Fund Access 
Individuals who sustained economic loss from the 
hurricane and whose primary residence is located in the 
Hurricane Katrina disaster area170 may withdraw, without 
  
 162   S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 202(a) (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 163   S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 303 (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 164   S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 304 (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 165  S. 1696, 109th Cong. § 403 (2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1696 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 166 Wesley Elmore, Tax Analysts, Inc., Senate Approves Compromise 
Hurricane Tax Relief Legislation, Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://www.pgdc.com/ 
uga/item/?item ID=300670.  
 167 Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016 
(2005) [hereinafter KETRA]. 
 168 Subsequent minor concurring changes were approved by both Houses.  
Legislation following the later 2005 hurricanes supplements or subsumes the KETRA 
relief.  See infra notes 223-81 and accompanying text. 
 169 DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, MAJOR TAX ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, CONG. 
RES. SERV. (C.R.S.) RL32719 (updated Dec. 8, 2005). 
 170 Defined as “an area with respect to which a major disaster has been 
declared by the President before September 14, 2005, under section 401 of the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act by reason of Hurricane 
Katrina.”  KETRA § 2.  Note, S. 1696 would have allowed a tax code change to I.R.C. § 
72, allowing penalty-free withdrawals for any presidentially-declared national 
emergency area. S. 1696, 109th Cong. §101 (2005) (Hurricane Katrina Tax Relief Act of 
2005) (unanimously passed Sept. 15, 2005; later vitiated the same day). 
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penalty,171 up to $100,000 from an eligible retirement plan.172  
These plans include individual retirement accounts,173 
annuities,174 and qualifying deferred compensation plans175 and 
trusts.176  Any money withdrawn from eligible plans that 
constitutes income remains taxable; however, the individual 
may spread the income over a three year period.177 
Individuals who receive qualified Hurricane Katrina 
distributions may make one or more replacement contributions 
within three years of receiving the distribution and treat any 
amounts repaid as a qualified rollover.178  Unless the 
repayment is made before any income tax is due, the individual 
would need to amend her return once repayments are made.179   
A victim may also borrow up to $100,000 from a 
qualified employer plan [I.R.C. § 401(a) or § 403(a) or (b) 
plan].180  This is double the amount of the traditional maximum 
loan that can be excluded from treatment as a distribution.181  
Relaxing these limits allows the taxpayer to access the funds 
without adverse tax consequences, providing the taxpayer 
agrees to repay over five years.182  In calculating the repayment 
period, the time from August 25, 2005, to December 31, 2006, is 
disregarded for all qualified victims with loans outstanding.183 
Together, these measures should afford quick access to 
cash for many middle class victims.  Most low-income 
taxpayers probably do not have substantial retirement reserves 
and many high-income taxpayers probably do not need this 
relief.  Nevertheless, the measures afford a creative and 
  
 171 I.R.C. § 72 generally imposes a ten percent penalty on early withdrawal. 
 172 KETRA § 101. 
 173 I.R.C. § 408(a). 
 174 I.R.C. §§ 403, 408(b). 
 175 I.R.C. § 457(b). 
 176 I.R.C. § 402(c)(8)(A). 
 177 KETRA § 101(e) presumes the income will be spread, unless the individual 
elects to have it taxed lump sum in the year received.  Id. 
 178 Id. § 101(c)(1).  To qualify, repayments must be made to an eligible 
retirement plan “in an aggregate amount not to exceed the amount of [the] 
distribution.”  Id.  
 179  See generally I.R.C. §§ 6072, 6161. 
 180 KETRA § 103(a).  As defined in I.R.C. § 72(p)(4), “qualified employer plan” 
means plans governed by I.R.C. §§ 401(a) and 403(a) and (b).  Relief pertaining to 
minimum funding standards for a plan to remain qualified was also granted.  I.R.S. 
Notice 2005-84 (Oct. 29, 2005). 
 181 See I.R.C. § 72(p)(1)-(2). 
 182 KETRA § 103(b). 
 183 Id. 
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important mechanism for those who need improved cash flow 
and can benefit now while repaying later.   
2. Employment Relief 
Two important tax credits were promulgated in KETRA 
as incentives to employers.  The first was available to all 
employers who hire “Hurricane Katrina employees;” the second 
was initially only available to small businesses184 located in the 
Hurricane Katrina core disaster area.185  The first credit was a 
special application of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit 
(WOTC).186  The second was a new form of tax credit aimed 
uniquely at the businesses that had to shut down, at least for 
one day, due to Hurricane Katrina.187  The provisions are highly 
complementary: one rewards employers in the disaster area 
who retained and paid their employees; the other rewards any 
business who picked up those workers who lost their jobs.   
The WOTC allows businesses a credit of forty percent of 
the first $6,000 of wages paid to any member of any targeted 
group.188  As applied to Hurricane Katrina employees, it 
provides a credit to businesses within or outside the core 
disaster area who hire employees whose principal place of 
abode is either within the core disaster area or who have been 
displaced from a principal abode in the core disaster area due 
to the hurricane.189  Any Katrina employees hired between 
August 28, 2005, and August 27, 2007, by a business located in 
the core disaster area qualify for the credit.190  For employers 
outside the core disaster area, only displaced employees hired 
before December 31, 2005, are considered Hurricane Katrina 
employees.191  
The original KETRA Employee Retention Credit had 
more strings attached.  To qualify, a business must have 
  
 184 KETRA § 202(c) (limiting eligible businesses to fewer than 200 employees) 
was repealed by the Gulf Zone Opportunity Act of 2005, and was replaced with an 
identical credit for eligible businesses of any size.  GO Zone Act of 2005 § 201, I.R.C. § 
1400R(a)(2)(A).  For full citation information of the GO Zone Act, see infra note 223.  
 185 KETRA defines “core disaster area” more strictly than “Hurricane Katrina 
disaster area” to limit eligibility to those areas determined by FEMA to warrant 
individual or individual and public assistance.  KETRA § 2. 
 186 See I.R.C. § 51. 
 187 KETRA § 202(b)(1). 
 188 I.R.C. § 51(a), (b)(3). 
 189 KETRA § 201. 
 190 Id. § 201(b)(1). 
 191 Id. § 201(b)(2). 
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employed fewer than 200 employees and must have been 
located in a core disaster area on August 28, 2005.192  The 
business must have become inoperable between this date and 
January 1, 2006, as a result of damages from Katrina.193  The 
business must also have had employees who worked in the core 
disaster area before the hurricane and who were paid wages 
between August 29, and December 31, 2005.194  
For employers meeting all of these requirements, the 
tax relief is very similar to the WOTC credit.  The qualifying 
business can claim forty percent of the first $6,000 for each 
retained employee.195  For a company retaining a large number 
of workers, the relief could be substantial.  For example, a 
company retaining 150 workers could potentially claim a 
$360,000 credit.   
The credit amount is based upon “qualified wages,” 
however, so is thereby limited to wages paid after the business 
became inoperable and before the business resumed significant 
operations.196  Thus, if a business was only shut down for two 
days and payroll to each eligible employee was $50 per day, the 
credit would only be $6,000, versus $360,000 based on the 
example above.  This additional restriction is sensible given the 
circumstances because it prevents a business only incidentally 
impacted from receiving a windfall. 
3. Incentives for Charity 
Following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, charities raised 
more than $2.5 billion.197  This amount rivals the $2.7 billion in 
donations following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.198  Despite the near record levels of giving, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted some 
difficulties in coordination between government relief efforts 
and charitable relief efforts, and among the various charitable 
organizations themselves.199  The GAO also identified 
  
 192 Id. § 202(b)(1), (c). 
 193  Id. § 202(b)(1)(B). 
 194  Id. § 202(b)(3). 
 195  KETRA § 202(a). 
 196 Id. § 202(b)(3). 
 197 GAO, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: PROVISION OF CHARITABLE 
ASSISTANCE 2, GAO-06-297T (2005).  
 198 Id. at 3. 
 199 Id. at 7.  See also GAO, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: COORDINATION 
BETWEEN FEMA AND THE RED CROSS SHOULD BE IMPROVED FOR THE 2006 HURRICANE 
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significant shortfalls in the appropriate use and accountability 
of $126 million in international assistance.200 
KETRA contains six general charitable incentives or 
rewards.  Two are significant—the temporary lifting of 
deduction limitations for charitable donations and the 
additional exemption for those housing displaced individuals—
and will be dealt with in greater detail below.  The other four 
are more minor.  The mileage rate for charitable use of a 
vehicle was substantially increased.201  In the alternative, 
reimbursement for charitable use of a vehicle to provide 
Hurricane Katrina relief was excluded from income.202  Donors 
of books to public schools were given explicit relief from 
downward adjustments of the deduction (to offset capital gains 
as required by Section 170(e)).203  Finally, businesses were 
encouraged to donate food inventory (up to ten percent of the 
businesses’ aggregate income) before December 31, 2005.204 
KETRA Section 302, the additional exemption for 
housing individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina, provides 
perhaps the most novel tax relief.  It allows a $500 exemption 
in 2005 or 2006 for each Katrina victim taken in.205  The 
maximum reduction of income for any taxpayer is limited to 
$2,000 (four displaced persons).206  Relief is restricted to 
situations where the taxpayer does not receive rent from the 
displaced individual (or any other amount from any source) in 
connection with providing the housing.207  Also, the displaced 
  
SEASON 3, GAO-06-712 (2006) (differing views about responsibilities hampered efforts 
to coordinate federal mass care assistance). 
 200 See GAO, HURRICANE KATRINA: COMPREHENSIVE POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE USE OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 3, GAO-06-460 (2006).  As of March 16, 2006, $60 million 
remained undistributed and there were no plans for use of $400 million of pledged and 
expected donations.  Id. at 10, 12.  
 201 Compare I.R.C. § 170(i) (14 cents per mile), with KETRA § 303 (70% of 
standard business rate—yielding 32 cents per mile).  I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2005-78 (Dec. 2, 
2005). 
 202 KETRA § 304. 
 203 While undoubtedly prompted by the need to restock public schools 
following Katrina, tax relief was not limited to donations to those affected by Hurricane 
Katrina.  Id. § 306(a).  However, the December 31, 2005, termination eliminates its 
utility for future crisis situations.  Id. § 306(b).   
 204 Id. § 305.   
 205 Id. § 302. 
 206 Id. § 302(b)(1). 
 207 Id. § 302(c). 
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individual cannot be the spouse or dependent of the taxpayer.208  
Note that there is no restriction on other relatives.209 
The final incentive to charitable donations was a lifting 
of the ceiling on charitable deductions.210  The ceiling is 
typically ten percent of a corporate taxpayer’s taxable income211 
or one-half of an individual taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.212  
KETRA also lifts the overall limitation on itemized deductions 
for individuals in Code Section 68.213  KETRA allows these 
ceilings to be ignored for any individual charitable 
contributions made after August 28, 2005, and before 
December 31, 2005.214  Unlike the tax relief for individuals, for 
corporations to qualify, the contribution must be earmarked for 
Hurricane Katrina relief.215   
4. Additional Relief 
Several types of additional targeted tax relief were also 
authorized.  The casualty deduction was improved by 
eliminating the $100 reduction and the ten percent AGI 
threshold for Katrina victims;216 the rules for determining 
earned income were relaxed;217 special rules were crafted to 
enable hurricane disaster areas to qualify as targeted areas for 
mortgage revenue bonds;218 the time period to avoid recognition 
of a capital gain upon involuntary conversion of real property 
(by purchasing suitable replacement property) was extended to 
  
 208 KETRA § 302(c)(3).  
 209 Id.  With respect to taxable years 2005 and 2006, the Secretary has 
authority to ensure that taxpayers do not lose any deduction or credit, or experience a 
change of filing status, by reason of temporary relocations caused by Hurricane 
Katrina.  Id. § 407. Of course, only one taxpayer may claim an individual as a 
dependent. 
 210 KETRA § 301; see I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (limiting most charitable deductions 
to 50% of the taxpayer’s contribution base); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (limiting other 
charitable deductions to 30% of the taxpayer’s contribution base).  Ordinarily, excess 
donations may be carried forward for the next five years.  I.R.C. § 170(d). 
 211 I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). 
 212 See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (B).  The taxpayer’s contribution base is AGI, 
computed without regard to any net operating loss carryback.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F); see 
also I.R.C. § 172.  
 213 KETRA § 301(c).    
 214 Id. § 301(a), (d)(1)(A). 
 215 Id. § 301(d)(1)(B). 
 216 Id. § 402. 
 217 Id. § 406. 
 218 Id. § 404. 
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five years for Hurricane Katrina victims;219 victims whose debt 
was forgiven were allowed to exclude such relief from income;220 
and Congress required the IRS to extend filing and payment of 
taxes for those in the disaster area until at least February 28, 
2006.221   
IV. GO ZONE RELIEF AND SELECTIVE RELIEF FOR VICTIMS 
OF HURRICANES RITA AND WILMA  
KETRA opened the door to wide-ranging tax relief for 
hurricane victims.  After the continued devastation wrought by 
Hurricanes Rita and Wilma over the following weeks, it would 
hardly be fair to ignore the needs of the new victims.  However, 
when the later hurricanes struck, Congress had not yet passed 
the long-term tax incentives it was working on for Hurricane 
Katrina victims.222  The tax relief for those affected by the later 
hurricanes was therefore wrapped into the more far-reaching 
relief for those affected by Hurricane Katrina.  Although this 
approach had the tremendous advantage of expediting relief to 
the victims of the later catastrophes, a layer of complexity was 
added, because the relief was not uniform for all victims and all 
areas.   
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone Act) 
was passed on December 15, 2005, and signed on December 21, 
2005.223  The “core disaster area” for Hurricane Katrina was 
renamed the “Gulf Opportunity Zone,” or “GO Zone,”224 and 
similar tax advantaged areas were established for the victims 
of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma—the “Rita GO Zone”225 and 
“Wilma GO Zone.”226  As with the initial KETRA relief, only 
those areas determined by the President to warrant individual 
  
 219 Compare KETRA § 405, with I.R.C. § 1033(h).  Property is involuntarily 
converted when seized, stolen, condemned, or destroyed.  I.R.C. § 1033(a).  
 220 KETRA § 401(a). 
 221 Id. § 403(b). 
 222 Before Rita struck, the President had announced a desire to create an 
opportunity zone for redevelopment, and Congress was working to pass such 
legislation.  Grassley Says Next Relief Package Will Focus on Long-Term Tax 
Incentives, TAX NOTES TODAY (Falls Church, Va.), Sept. 23, 2005 [hereinafter Grassley] 
(“We’re looking at depreciation changes, tax-exempt bond authority, tax-exempt bond 
refunding, and enterprise-zone initiatives.”).  
 223 Pub. L. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (codified at I.R.C. §§1400M-1400T) 
[hereinafter GO Zone Act]. 
 224 See id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(1); KETRA § 2(2). 
 225 GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(3). 
 226 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(5). 
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or individual and public assistance from the federal 
government qualified for special GO Zone tax benefits.227 
Title II of the GO Zone Act expressly extended certain 
tax relief measures adopted for Hurricane Katrina to 
Hurricanes Rita and Wilma.228  These measures directly 
parallel the KETRA relief and are summarized in Section A.  
The GO Zone Act also created new tax relief and incentives.  
Section B details the new tax relief common to all of the 
disasters.  Section C examines the unique new relief for certain 
victims of Hurricane Katrina.229  In addition to the credits and 
incentives discussed above, Congress included additional tax 
breaks in the GO Zone Act as an economic stimulus for the 
redevelopment of those areas hardest struck by Hurricane 
Katrina.   
A. Tax Relief Expanded to Victims of Rita and Wilma 
Special rules for use of retirement funds first adopted in 
KETRA were extended to also include individuals who 
sustained economic loss from Hurricanes Rita and Wilma.230  
Victims whose primary residences were located in the 
designated Hurricane Rita and Wilma disaster areas may also 
withdraw, without penalty, up to $100,000 from an eligible 
retirement plan.231  As in KETRA, individuals may prorate 
income over three years,232 repay within three years (and 
characterize the distribution as a rollover),233 or, if preferred, 
borrow up to $100,000 from their employer retirement savings 
plan and repay within five years.234  
The GO Zone Act broadly enhanced charitable giving 
incentives.235  To enjoy relief from the limitations on charitable 
giving, corporate taxpayers were allowed to make contributions 
to relief efforts supporting any of these three hurricanes.236  
  
 227 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(1), (3), (5). 
 228 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. §§ 1400Q-1400T. 
 229 Note, some of the victims of Hurricane Katrina were also victims of 
Hurricane Rita; if they qualify for individual or individual and public relief due to 
Katrina, these measures protect them.  Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400M(1). 
 230  Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q. 
 231 GO Zone Act § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q.  As in KETRA, I.R.C. § 402(c)(8)(B) 
defines a qualified retirement plan. 
 232 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q(a)(5)). 
 233 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q(a)(3). 
 234 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400Q(c). 
 235 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(a). 
 236 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
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Individual taxpayers enjoyed tax relief, so long as cash 
donations were made after August 28, 2005, and before 
December 31, 2005, regardless of whether the donations were 
linked to hurricane relief.237   
Those suffering casualty losses (Code Section 165) 
attributable to Hurricanes Rita and Wilma were allowed the 
same relief from the ten percent AGI and $100 reductions on 
casualty losses as allowed to the Katrina victims.238  The dates 
of the losses necessarily needed to correspond to the periods 
after the respective hurricanes made landfall.239 
Special rules for determining earned income related to 
the Earned Income Credit and the refundable component of the 
Child Tax Credit were likewise afforded to “qualified 
individuals” in the Wilma and Rita disaster areas.240  As with 
the Hurricane Katrina victims, to qualify, the individual had to 
either be displaced from his or her principal place of abode by 
the hurricane, or had to qualify for individual or individual and 
public assistance from the federal government.241   
Finally, procedural relief was extended to the new 
victims in the Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Wilma disaster 
areas.  Congress required the Secretary of the Treasury to 
extend under Code Section 7508A the period for filing and 
payment of taxes (and other tax-related deadlines) to all 
taxpayers in the three declared disaster areas, “for a period 
ending not earlier than February 28, 2006.”242   
B. New Tax Relief—All GO Zones 
Other than the benefits discussed above, no additional 
benefits were created for individual taxpayers affected by the 
later hurricanes.  However, some limited additional business 
benefits were created for all of the GO Zones.  
Special rules were crafted for mortgage revenue bonds 
to finance owner-occupied residences within any of the three 
GO Zones.  Most significantly, the maximum amount of 
qualifying home improvement loans was increased from 
$15,000 to $150,000 where proceeds were used to repair homes 
  
 237 GO Zone Act § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(i). 
 238 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(b). 
 239 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(b). 
 240 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(d)(2)(C), (D). 
 241 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(d)(2)(C), (D). 
 242 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400S(c). 
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located in the GO Zones.243  The GO Zone Act also reflected “the 
sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury, or the 
Secretary’s delegate, should designate one or more series of 
[U.S. savings] bonds or certificates . . . as ‘Gulf Coast Recovery 
Bonds’ in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.”244 
Employee retention credits245 of up to forty percent of the 
first $6,000 paid per retained employee were extended to 
eligible employers in the GO Zone, the Hurricane Rita GO 
Zone,246 and the Hurricane Wilma GO Zone.247  The new 
provision effectively repealed the similar KETRA provision 
(discussed in Part III.B.2).  Significantly, the KETRA 
limitation—that the credit was not available to large 
businesses—was removed.248  It is also worth noting that the 
Work Opportunity Tax Credit,249 which had been offered to 
those hiring Hurricane Katrina employees (including displaced 
employees), was not extended to employers hiring those 
affected by the later hurricanes.250 
Code Section 168(k) allows a taxpayer a thirty percent 
depreciation allowance for qualifying property placed in service 
after September 10, 2001, and before January 1, 2005.251  The 
GO Zone Act created discretionary authority for the Secretary 
to extend the “placed in service date” for any property to 
qualify for bonus depreciation, so long as the property was 
manufactured and placed in service within one of the three GO 
Zones by a person affected by the hurricanes.252  The Secretary 
is to exercise this discretion on a “taxpayer by taxpayer basis,” 
but in no event is the Secretary to extend the period by more 
than one year.253 
Small timber producers in all three GO Zones got a 
boost from the Act.254  Those taxpayers holding under five 
  
 243 GO Zone Act § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400T(a). 
 244 Id. § 301. 
 245 Id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400R.  
 246 Id. §§ 101(a), 201(a), I.R.C. §§ 1400M(3), 1400R(b). 
 247 Id. §§ 101(a), 201(a), I.R.C. §§ 1400M(5), 1400R(c). 
 248 Compare id. § 201(a), I.R.C. § 1400R, with KETRA § 202(c). 
 249 I.R.C. § 51 (discussed supra Part III.B.2). 
 250 See KETRA § 201. Katrina employees were identified as members of a 
targeted group under I.R.C. § 51 for purposes of this credit; the deadline for hiring 
displaced workers was Dec. 31, 2005.  Id.  
 251 I.R.C. § 168(k). 
 252 GO Zone Act § 105. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C § 1400N(i). 
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hundred acres of qualified timber property,255 any part of which 
lies within a GO Zone, may carry net operating losses back five 
years and characterize the losses as farming losses; increased 
expensing is also allowed.256  
Finally, for housing purposes, all three GO Zones are to 
be treated as “difficult development areas” under Section 42 of 
the Code.257  The designation facilitates Low-Income Housing 
Credits for any property placed in service in these areas from 
2006 through the end of 2008.258  Note that the credit is 
increased for the hurricane Katrina GO Zone.259 
C. Katrina Unique GO Zone Benefits 
1. Enhanced Education Tax Credits 
In this second wave of legislation, Congress provided an 
enhanced education tax credit, for tax years 2005 and 2006, for 
students who attended educational institutions in the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone.260  This relief effectively doubled the Hope or 
Lifetime Learning tax credit amounts for individuals under 
Code Section 25A.261  It also relaxed the definition of “qualified 
tuition and related expenses” so that room and board expenses 
could be considered.262  Such relief would be especially 
important to the thousands of students who had to transfer 
temporarily to other institutions. 
2. Economic Stimulus for the GO Zone  
a. Bonds and Community Development Credits 
Congress authorized nearly $8 billion in tax-exempt 
bond financing for the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama.263  Such bonds were allowed to be used to pay for 
construction of residential rental projects, for construction (or 
  
 255 See I.R.C. § 194(c)(1). 
 256 GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(i). 
 257 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(c)(3). 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(c)(1). 
 260 Id. § 102(a), I.R.C. § 1400O. 
 261 Id.  
 262 GO Zone Act § 102(a), I.R.C. § 1400O. 
 263 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(b). 
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reconstruction or improvement) of nonresidential real property, 
or for public utility construction in the GO Zone.264   
Seven hundred million dollars in additional tax credits 
were created for redevelopment of the GO Zone.265  The new 
markets tax credit was available only to qualified community 
development agencies making qualified low-income community 
investments within the GO Zone.266   
b. Housing Incentives  
As noted above, the GO Zone was included as a difficult 
development area and was also singled out for enhanced low-
income housing credit.  In the past, the IRS had granted 
similar relief under its discretionary authority pursuant to 
I.R.C. Section 42(n).267  Such relief was available in response to 
a request from the affected State.268  The statutory relief 
obviated the need for the state to come forward and request it.   
The GO Zone tax-relief measures also included a tax 
credit for employer-provided housing.269  The credit is equal to 
thirty percent of the amount excludable from the gross income 
of qualifying employees [up to $600 per month] for lodging 
furnished by the employer from January 1, 2006, to July 1, 
2006.   
c. Other Business Incentives  
Businesses in the GO Zone are entitled to a special 
depreciation allowance for GO Zone Property placed into 
service from August 28, 2005, through the end of 2007 (2008 for 
nonresidential real property and residential rental property).270  
Fifty percent of the adjusted basis of the property (adjusted 
basis is typically the property’s cost) can be written off the first 
  
 264 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(a)(4). 
 265 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(m). 
 266 Id. § 102(a), I.R.C. § 1400O. 
 267 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147 (describing relief in Florida 
from damage due to Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne); I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, supra 
note 150 (describing relief in Alabama from damage due to Ivan); I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, 
supra note 150 (describing relief in Ohio due to post-hurricane storms and flooding). 
 268  See generally I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, 
supra note 150; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150 (describing state requests). 
 269 GO Zone Act § 103(a), I.R.C. § 1400P(a), (b), (f).   
 270 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(d). 
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year, plus ordinary depreciation can then be taken on the 
remaining fifty percent.271   
The amount of immediate tax relief is also substantially 
enhanced because of increased expensing allowances for 
durable business property.272  The limits under Code Section 
179 are increased by up to $100,000 on the capital property 
(otherwise required to be depreciated over time) that can be 
deducted in the immediate year as a current expense.273   
Taxpayers are also allowed to elect to take up to fifty 
percent of any GO Zone clean-up cost as a deduction for the 
taxable year in which the cost is incurred.274  They can also 
deduct one hundred percent of any environmental remediation 
costs, including remediation of hazardous substances as well as 
petroleum products, in the year clean-up costs are incurred.275  
To qualify for either of these special provisions, the clean-up 
must be conducted before December 31, 2007.276   
The rules regarding GO Zone casualty losses are 
incredibly generous.  Instead of the typical two-year carryback 
period,277 the Act allows a five-year carryback for any “qualified 
Gulf Opportunity Zone loss.”278  This term is defined as the 
lesser of (1) net operating loss (NOL) minus ten-year carryback 
loss,279 or (2) the sum of GO Zone casualty losses, plus 
deductions of moving expenses paid to vacate a home as a 
result of Katrina, plus amounts paid to temporarily house 
employees, plus depreciation of GO Zone property, plus clean-
up and repair costs due to Katrina.280 
In addition to the sweeping relief described above, 
special tax treatment is also extended to designated industries.  
For example, the public utility industry is afforded more 
generous casualty loss relief.281 
  
 271 Id.  For a $100,000 machine, the qualifying taxpayer would receive a 
$50,000 depreciation bonus. 
 272 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(e); see also I.R.C. § 179(b). 
 273  GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(e); see also I.R.C. § 179(b). 
 274 GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(f). 
 275 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(g). 
 276 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(f), (g). 
 277 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1). 
 278 GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(k). 
 279 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(C). 
 280 GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(k)(2). 
 281 Id. § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(j). 
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V. IMPROVING TAX POLICY THROUGH PREDICTABILITY AND 
VICTIM EQUITY 
There are two principal contentions in the materials 
that follow: (1) those meritorious tax measures designed to aid 
the victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma should be 
improved and expanded to reach victims of all casualties, and 
(2) these beneficial changes should be incorporated into the tax 
code so that financial and tax planning can be more 
predictable.  The discussion looks not only at what has been 
done, but also at what could be done, including measures 
currently proposed.  Equity and predictability serve as the 
barometers for the analysis. 
Although some of the tax relief measures flowing from 
the 2005 hurricanes should be abandoned, many should be 
extended to victims of all casualties, and some of the relief 
measures should go even further to improve both horizontal 
and vertical equity.   
Horizontal equity is treating similarly situated 
taxpayers in a similar manner.282  Vertical equity ensures 
fairness among taxpayers with different income levels.283  
Under our progressive tax system, vertical equity requires that 
taxpayers in lower brackets bear less of the tax burden than 
those with higher incomes (and presumably more ability to 
pay).284 
There are a number of difficulties in applying tax relief 
and incentives to provide relief to victims of disasters.  For 
example, tax benefits are not easily targeted to lower income 
individuals.285  Also, unbridled tax relief is akin to 
unconstrained federal spending—they both can break the bank.   
That being said, if these difficulties can be surmounted, 
then tax relief could be used to improve the dire circumstances 
of a great many Americans at a time when they are facing 
perhaps their lives’ greatest tragedy.  To insure fiscal 
responsibility, the relief should be carefully tailored to 
maximize the benefits to those most in need.  To better 
appreciate the proposals in the parts that follow, the remainder 
  
 282 David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006).   
 283 JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS 25 (3d ed. 2005).  
 284 Id. at 15, 17-25. 
 285 GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 2. 
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of this section focuses on the flaws in the recent hurricane tax 
incentives and the present tax regime. 
While noble in its attempts to afford relief to the 
numerous victims of the disasters, Congress’ ad hoc legislative 
response to the 2005 hurricanes resulted in measures either 
too broad or too narrow to constitute effective tax policy.  In 
particular, tax-related relief from Congress and the Internal 
Revenue Service has been voluminous and at times redundant, 
complex, and confusing.286  Legislators and bureaucrats have 
not always been on the same page.287  Now that the waters have 
settled, it is fitting to examine the lessons learned. 
To receive the optimal benefit, money must quickly 
reach those who have been devastated the most.  The true way 
to “fast-track” relief is to approve it now for all future victims.  
Congress should work closely with the IRS to foster ready 
implementation of appropriate tax relief to reach those 
businesses and individuals most affected.  The trigger for such 
recovery should be both predictable and equitable.   
Even though the specific answers to the tax relief 
problem should be the focus of further academic and 
Congressional discussion, now is the time to acknowledge the 
problem and begin the debate.  The following suggestions may 
offer hope of a more promising and beneficial future.288   
A. Incentives for Charitable Donations Aided the Wealthy 
and Were Inadequately Linked to Relief for Those Struck 
by the Tragedy 
Charity for those in need is a virtue,289 and the 
charitable outpouring that flowed from the hurricanes was 
  
 286 The two new laws affording a myriad of tax relief measures (KETRA, supra 
note 167, and GO Zone Act, supra note 223) were accompanied by no fewer than eighty 
IRS pronouncements in the months following Katrina.  The count is derived from 
searches for the term “Hurricane Katrina” in the Westlaw databases Federal Taxation 
– IRS Cumulative Bulletins and Federal Tax –  IRS News Releases databases. 
 287 See, e.g., infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text. 
 288 Note that deliberation about tax relief for victims of catastrophes is 
warranted, even if the income tax is replaced with a flat tax or consumption tax.  
Jerome Kurtz, Two Cheers for the Income Tax, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 161, 165-66 (2001) 
(noting political impracticality of Congress refusing tax relief to disaster victims under 
any tax system). 
 289 See, e.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, pt. 3, § 1, ch. 1, art. 7, ¶¶ 1822-
29, available at http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect1chpt1art7.htm (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
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remarkable.290  However, it was more likely the magnitude of 
the disasters, rather than the promise of additional tax relief, 
that prompted most of this widespread generosity.291  Indeed, 
most of the donations from within the United States were made 
before KETRA was passed,292 and $126 million worth of aid was 
donated from abroad.293  Clearly, none of this aid was prompted 
by the promise of U.S. tax relief.   
Undoubtedly, some taxpayers did choose to donate more 
to charity in the latter half of 2005 because of the promise of 
tax relief.  The tax relief accruing to Vice President Cheney for 
his family’s $6.8 million in charitable donations for tax year 
2005 even drew media attention (with commentators noting 
that the relief did not go to disaster victims).294  The Cheneys 
should not be faulted for their generosity; rather, the example 
should illustrate the underlying problems with the tax relief 
itself.   
This tax policy violates vertical equity, because only 
those with donations above the suspended limits would benefit.  
Those likely to benefit the most would have to have sufficient 
wealth to be able to subsist on less than fifty percent of their 
AGI.295  Perhaps when you make millions or billions of dollars 
in income you can afford to give much of it away.296  However, 
  
 290 See GAO-06-297T, supra note 197 ($2.5 billion contributed to charities in a 
little over three months); see also Press Release, Giving USA Found., Charitable Giving 
Rises 6 Percent to More Than $260 Billion in 2005: Disaster Relief Tops All Records 
and Totals 3 Percent of All Giving (June 19, 2006), http://www.aafrc.org/press_releases/ 
trustreleases/0606_PR.pdf.  
 291 Stephanie Strom, Many Dismissing ‘Donor Fatigue’ as Myth, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2006, at A22 (“Fund-raising experts said it was unlikely that the tax break 
accounted for [gains in donations] because many charities did not know about it in time 
to capitalize on it.”).  
 292 See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 9 (citing Elizabeth Williamson, Charitable 
Giving: A Generous Response Tends to Slow, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A25). 
 293 GAO-06-460, supra note 200. 
 294 See Christopher Lee, Bushes Paid $187,768 in Federal Income Tax; First 
Couple’s Earnings Totaled About $735,000; Cheneys Made $8.8 Million, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 15, 2006, at A9; Marc D. Hoffman, Vice President and Mrs. Cheney Too Generous?  
PLANNED GIVING DESIGN CENTER, Apr. 21, 2006, http://www.pgdc.com/usa/ 
item/?itemID=346546.  Note the Cheneys have made disaster relief donations in the 
past.  See, e.g., Stephanie Kriner, Lynne Cheney Donates Book Proceeds to Disaster 
Relief Fund, AM. RED CROSS, Dec. 14, 2001, http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/ 
donations/011214cheney.html. 
 295 I.R.C. § 68 normally requires high-income itemizers to reduce deductions 
by 3% of the amount by which their AGI exceeds $100,000 (as adjusted for inflation) or 
by 80% of their itemized amount (whichever is less).  I.R.C. § 170 normally caps 
allowable donations at 50% of AGI for the taxable year (though donations in excess of 
that amount may be carried forward for up to five years). 
 296 See Lee, supra note 294.  Warren Buffett’s record-setting multibillion 
dollar donations in 2006 would tend to confirm that the ultra-wealthy can afford huge 
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most middle class or poor taxpayers simply could not afford to 
be prompted by these measures.297  Additionally, because of the 
way the Code is structured, only taxpayers who itemize could 
benefit from the relief.298   
Even if taxpayers were motivated to donate more 
because of tax relief, the amount that went to aid the victims is 
highly suspect.  Studies show that taxpayers who donate more 
than fifty percent of their AGI tend to designate churches, 
educational institutions (such as colleges and universities), and 
private foundations as the principal recipients.299  Money 
donated to private organizations is often saved and not spent 
immediately.300  Money donated to schools, other than those in 
the disaster area, is unlikely to benefit the victims.  Even 
donations to religious organizations tend predominantly to 
support religious services and infrastructure costs, versus aid 
to the poor.301   
Although the tax measures allowed flexibility in terms 
of recipients, the fear of “donor fatigue,” the notion that 
taxpayers may shortchange other charities by diverting relief 
to the victims of the disasters, never materialized.302  According 
to Giving USA, a foundation devoted to research and education 
in philanthropy, while disaster relief topped all records in 
2005, the average charitable giving per household in the 
United States remained at 2.2% of disposable income, exactly 
the same as the forty-year average.303  Furthermore, the 
amount of charitable donations targeted toward disaster relief 
was a meager three percent of all charitable donations.304 
  
donations.  See Editorial, Buffett Gives Up His Fortune: Largest Charitable Gift in 
History Will Benefit Those Who Need Help Most, BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), June 28, 2006, 
at A8. 
 297 See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 8-9. 
 298 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, temporarily 
allowed a charitable deduction for taxpayers who did not itemize; this capability for 
non-itemizers terminated in 1986.  S. REP. NO. 107-211, at *4 n.3 (2002), 2002 WL 
1590762.  Unlike the proposed CARE Act of 2002, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (see S. REP. NO. 
107-211, at *4-*6, 2002 WL 1590762), recent tax reform legislation does not authorize 
charitable deductions for non-itemizers.  See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
 299 GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 9. 
 300 Id.  
 301 “[A]bout 70% of spending of religious organizations goes for services (the 
church building, the minister), and only about 6% goes to poor people.”  Id. at 9 n.12 
(citing Jeff E. Biddle, Religious Organizations, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR? 92, 92-133 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992)). 
 302 Strom, supra note 291. 
 303 Press Release, Giving USA Found., supra note 290, at 2. 
 304 Id. at 1. 
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B. Ad Hoc Relief Is Inefficient and Inequitable 
1. Not on Same Sheet of Music 
A defining feature of an emergency is that time is of the 
essence.  For this reason, prior planning is essential.  In the 
absence of prior planning, people are often forced to react 
without benefit of all available information.  The stress of the 
moment may cause them to react rashly, or may paralyze them 
into inactivity.  Confusion is almost certain to ensue, as there 
may be little time for coordination and decision-making.  
In addressing tax relief for families, Congressman 
Rahm Emanuel and Senator Barack Obama proposed in a 
September 14, 2005, letter to Treasury Secretary John W. 
Snow that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Child Tax 
Credit, and education incentives be immediately accelerated.305  
They proposed to capture such relief in a Bill entitled the 
“Hurricane Katrina Accelerated Tax Refund Act.”306  The letter 
acknowledged a policy goal of allowing “Americans who have 
lost so much [to] receive their refunds now rather than later.”307   
The administration resisted this program, noting: “The 
significant resources that the legislation would require might 
outweigh the benefit of a short acceleration of the refunds.”308  
Congressional good intentions met with an administrative 
inability to quickly execute those intentions.  It is precisely for 
these reasons that the Code should be rewritten so that a well-
planned network of readily executable and predictable 
consequences automatically ensues in the wake of a natural 
disaster.   
2. Post-Hurricane Tax Relief Was Inequitable  
Horizontal equity requires treating similar taxpayers 
similarly.  All other things being equal, it simply would not be 
fair to allow blue-eyed taxpayers to itemize while denying this 
  
 305 Letter from U.S. Rep. Rahm Emanuel and U.S. Sen. Barack Obama to 
John W. Snow, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Sept. 14, 2005), available at 2005 WL 
3370031. 
 306 Id.  The bill was never proposed.  For a discussion of proposed legislation, 
see supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text. 
 307 Id.  The letter erroneously asserted a precedent for “fast-tracking” refunds 
based on the tragic events of September 11, 2001.  See id.; Letter from Eric Solomon, 
Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y (Tax Policy), to U.S. Rep. Rahm Emanuel (Nov. 2, 2005). 
 308 Letter from Eric Solomon, supra note 307. 
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opportunity to brown-eyed taxpayers.  In other words, there 
must be some justification for treating individuals with 
identical incomes in different manners.  The greatest fault of 
the 2005 tax-relief measures is their failure to ensure 
horizontal equity.  Based on the Code, as amended by the two 
Acts, there are six different classes of 2005 disaster victims—
GO Zone residents (Katrina core disaster area); other Katrina 
disaster area victims; Rita and Wilma GO Zone residents; other 
Rita and Wilma disaster area victims; victims in other declared 
disaster areas; and other victims not in a declared disaster 
area.309  Creation of preferred classes of victims makes little 
sense. 
For example, it is nonsensical that mileage allowances 
are higher for volunteers who engaged in Hurricane Katrina 
relief efforts than those who responded to Hurricanes Rita or 
Wilma, or to any other disaster for that matter.  In each 
scenario, people need help, and others are willing to volunteer 
to provide it.  All these noble volunteers should be equally 
entitled to the same tax refunds or tax-free reimbursements.  
Under the Code, the allowable mileage rate has been lower for 
such volunteer costs than for business costs,310 and Congress is 
the best arbiter of what the appropriate ratio should be as a 
matter of public policy.    However, once that decision is made, 
the ratio should be a constant for all disaster response.  Then, 
as gas prices escalate and the business mileage rates rise, 
commensurate relief would be afforded to all rescuers, relief 
workers, and other volunteers. 
All of the benefits unique to Hurricane Katrina should 
be scrutinized based on considerations of horizontal equity.  
The only measures that should withstand such scrutiny are 
those for which Hurricane Katrina warrants disparate 
treatment on other policy grounds.  In other words, a 
justification needs to be articulated to warrant additional relief 
to Hurricane Katrina victims.  Where there is no such 
justification, and the measures are otherwise meritorious, 
limiting such relief either to Hurricane Katrina victims or to 
Hurricane Katrina, Rita, and Wilma victims makes these 
  
 309  See supra Parts III and IV for a detailed discussion of the different tax 
treatment of victims following the hurricanes of 2005. 
 310  Compare I.R.C. § 170(i) (limiting charitable mileage to fourteen cents per 
mile), with Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2) (allowing standard business mileage at rates 
established by IRS).  Since 1998, the standard business mileage rate has been at or 
above 31 cents per mile.  See Rev. Proc. 98-63, 1998-2 C.B. 818.  
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measures under-inclusive of others who would benefit from the 
same tax treatment. 
As an analogy, if public transportation benefits those 
without a car who live two miles from work, then it stands to 
reason it also benefits those without a car who live three miles 
from work.  If the government decided it would be sound policy 
to offer free transportation to those in need, limiting the relief 
to those who live two miles from work would be under-
inclusive.  The policy would be over-inclusive if it afforded 
relief to those who did not require it, such as affording free 
public transportation to those living two miles from work who 
own cars. 
It is less obvious, but equally the case, that the 2005 tax 
relief has been over-inclusive.  For example, to the extent that 
time extensions were given to those who did not need it (those 
in the core disaster areas that were not flooded or did not lose 
records), relief was over-inclusive.  Perhaps allowing the 
disaster areas to serve as surrogates for those impacted by the 
disaster is warranted if it makes tax administration easier, 
especially where Congress is trying to economically stimulate 
renewed spending and investment in the local communities.  
However, where tax measures afford significant financial relief, 
our lawmakers need to be mindful of these additional costs. 
C. Excessive Relief Stimulates Undesirable Behavior 
Those who choose to live in higher-risk areas should 
bear those risks.  Indeed, if there is no accountability for bad 
choices, then those choices will continue to be made.  
Ultimately, if the federal government absorbs or absolves 
individuals of all costs of their risky behavior, the costs are 
never internalized into the decision-making process.311   
Some have argued that those who choose to live in 
higher-risk areas should also bear a higher share of the 
emergency response and recovery costs.312  They contend that 
“tax benefit equity requires that the costs of local emergency 
  
 311 For an interesting analysis of how flood insurance and protective measures 
may actually induce increased risk of catastrophic loss, see Raymond J. Burby, 
Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About 
Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI., Mar. 2006, at 171. 
 312 Robert E. Deyle & Mary Kay Falconer, Revenue Options for a Risk-Based 
Assessment of Developed Property in Hurricane Hazard Zones, 18 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 299, 300-01 (2003). 
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management services necessitated by development of land 
exposed to hurricanes be allocated among property owners in 
proportion to the demand they create for such services.”313  
Difficulties arise, however, in allocating proportions of 
emergency service costs to hurricanes and in estimating such 
costs, because “most jurisdictions have had no more than one 
hurricane within the past 10 or 20 years.”314 
Ironically, federal aid through FEMA and emergency 
relief through non-profit organizations such as the Red Cross 
may have exacerbated difficulties for small businesses by 
affording cash to people who would otherwise have been 
working.315  This relief may have served as a disincentive to 
laborers, whom local businesses could have put to productive 
use. 
VI. ENHANCED PROCEDURAL RELIEF IS NEEDED 
Relief should be geared to that which is predictable.  
But what is predictable?  Following a tragedy, taxpayers may 
not have access to their personal papers, tax documents, or 
other such items; people and businesses will be in a 
disadvantaged economic position; lives will be torn apart; and 
people may die.  For most disasters, someone will want to 
help.316  While the tax code cannot bring the dead back to life, it 
can be used to help restore or improve the economic life of all 
casualty victims.  Essentially, both substantive and procedural 
relief should be afforded to all taxpayers suffering a casualty 
loss.   
We could all use more time and money.  Obviously, 
there are costs of foregone revenue, to the extent the 
government allows any monetary tax relief (whether in the 
form of credits, deductions, or exclusions from income).  To the 
extent the IRS grants additional time, on the other hand, the 
government is deferring, versus reducing, income.  Due to the 
time value of money, deferral carries with it some intrinsic 
costs (a dollar repaid next year is not worth as much as one 
  
 313 Id. at 305. 
 314 Id. at 304. 
 315 Runyan, supra note 158, at 23 (writing that small business owners saw 
FEMA handouts as disincentives for employees to return to work). 
 316 The I.R.C. treatment of gifts helps individuals get back on their feet by 
excluding the value of the gift from income.  I.R.C. § 102.  Further, the Red Cross helps 
many in need, even when no disaster has been declared. Allowing this relief to be free 
from taxation aids the victims. See generally I.R.C. § 139.  
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paid today);317 however, when it comes to disaster victims, these 
costs are negligible compared to the public policy benefits.   
The potential for so much good is justification enough to 
at least explore whether certain tax measures might sensibly 
be employed as tools to aid victims of disaster.  To the extent 
that tax-related proposals are equitable, simple, and 
inexpensive to administer, they should be thoughtfully 
considered now, before the next disaster strikes.  
The IRS has been sensitive to hardships faced by 
victims and has granted relief in the past.318  Indeed, the IRS 
has itself been the victim of Mother Nature.319  When IRS 
facilities were struck by Hurricane Rita, the Service granted 
itself an extension for performing government actions 
associated with processing disaster-related returns.320  The 
principles here should be governed more by common sense and 
fair dealing than by concerns about maximizing every penny of 
tax revenue—the U.S. government ought not kick individuals 
when they are down.  Based upon principles of horizontal 
equity, these changes should be extended to all casualty 
victims. 
Code Section 7508A, affording the IRS discretionary 
authority to extend filing and payment deadlines, could easily 
be modified to mandate such essential relief.  KETRA, for 
example, mandated that the IRS extend deadlines for the 
Katrina disaster area “at least until February 28, 2006.”321  An 
identical mandate was contained in the GO Zone Act for all 
those within the declared disaster areas of the other 
  
 317 To combat the effects of deferral, ordinarily the IRS collects interest under 
I.R.C. § 6404, even when penalties are waived based on hardship or just cause. 
 318 See supra Part II.D. 
 319 IRS headquarters at 1111 Constitution Avenue, was closed for at least a 
month in 2006 and sustained millions of dollars in damage due to torrential rains in 
the Washington, D.C., area.   Megan Greenwell, IRS HQ Partly Closed Until January, 
WASH. POST, July 11, 2006, 2006 WLNR 11951703.   
 320 I.R.S. Notice 2005-82, 2005-47 I.R.B. 978.  
Documents maintained by the IRS within the covered disaster area may have 
been lost or destroyed as a result of Hurricane Rita, or remain in buildings 
that are inaccessible. The destruction, loss or inaccessibility of these 
documents will materially interfere with the IRS’s ability to timely 
administer the internal revenue laws with respect to certain taxpayers. 
Id. at 978-79. 
 321 KETRA § 403(b).  Katrina relief included automatic waivers of filing 
deadlines and payment of taxes, automated abatement of any interest and penalties, 
and time extensions for all actions identified in I.R.C. § 7508(a)(1).  Id.   
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hurricanes.322  Congress could just as easily grant six months of 
relief to every taxpayer in a declared disaster area, or even to 
every taxpayer claiming a casualty loss. 
For victims of Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki, and 
the hurricanes of 2004, the IRS granted generous global 
extensions to taxpayers in the designated disaster areas or 
those who alleged to have been affected by these disasters.323  
Similar relief was afforded to victims of September 11, 2001.324  
The IRS has also granted extensions due to earthquakes, fires, 
blackouts, and floods.325  The amount of relief for these declared 
disasters has varied from a few days or weeks to many 
months.326   
In 2006, the IRS automated the extension process for all 
taxpayers (not just disaster victims).327  The new process grants 
taxpayers a six month extension for filing, but taxpayers 
remain liable for paying estimated taxes and face late payment 
penalties and interest if they have not made an adequate 
payment at the time taxes are originally due.328  In light of the 
potential administrative burden of extending the deadlines for 
all taxpayers (of whom those impacted by disasters are only a 
small percentage), the only consequence to the government of 
automated relief for disaster victims is the waiver of interest 
and penalties.  
Congress should take the next step to make relief from 
interest and penalties mandatory, versus discretionary, for all 
declared disaster areas.  Such a change would lead to greater 
tax equity among those impacted by presidentially-declared 
  
 322 I.R.C. § 1400S(c).  The IRS later used its statutory discretion to extend 
further the filing and payment deadlines until August 28, 2006, but for Hurricane 
Katrina victims only.  I.R.S. Notice 2006-20, 2006-10 I.R.B. 560-61 (redefining “covered 
disaster area” to include only the GO Zone). 
 323 See supra Part II.D. 
 324 I.R.S. Notice 2001-61, 2001-2 C.B. 305, 305-06. 
 325 E.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-94-5 (Jan. 19, 1994) (Los Angeles earthquake); 
I.R.S. Notice 94-87, 1994-2 C.B. 559, 559-60 (Southeast floods); I.R.S. News Release IR-
2003-100 (Aug. 15, 2003) (Northeast blackout); I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1 C.B. 989, 
989-90 (Cerro Grande fire). 
 326 See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-100, supra note 325 (granting seven 
days for the blackout); I.R.S. News Release IR-94-5, supra note 325 (granting ten days 
for the earthquake); I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-118, supra note 148 (granting 108 
days for Hurricane Ivan); I.R.S. Notice 2001-30, 2001-1 C.B. 989, supra note 325 
(granting nine months for the Cerro Grande fire).  
 327 I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-58 (Apr. 10, 2006). 
 328 Id.  See also I.R.C. § 6081 (authorizing Secretary to extend filing deadline 
up to six months); Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-4T(c) (requiring timely tax payment 
notwithstanding filing extension).  
846 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3 
disasters by imposing predictable and uniform consequences, 
instead of an ad hoc disaster-by-disaster approach by the IRS.  
It should also be easier for the IRS to implement than a system 
where each disaster must be individually considered.   
Even where disasters have not been declared, Congress 
should grant an automatic six month extension waiving 
interest and penalties for every casualty loss.  Penalty relief 
has been available in the past to such casualty victims, but it 
has not been guaranteed; rather, each case has been evaluated 
on its merits, and the IRS has made individual determinations 
as to whether to grant relief.329  Such a case-by-case 
determination method is intrinsically time-consuming, 
requiring taxpayer initiation of a request for relief, IRS 
investigation and corroboration of the factual assertions, and 
ultimately an IRS determination.330  Even where relief is 
granted, it may take the bureaucracy months to come to this 
determination.331  Interest has not been similarly relieved.332 
A better approach would be to statutorily grant six 
months of relief under Code Section 7508A to any victim based 
  
 329 I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 
20.1.1.3.2.5  (Aug. 20, 1998), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/ch01s01.html.  Bona fide 
reasons for relief include taxpayers being unable to access their records or, as the 
result of an accident, taxpayers being hospitalized and thus unable to file the return or 
pay the tax.  Id.  Fire, casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbances are merely 
factors to consider, not necessarily sufficient in and of themselves to justify penalty 
relief.  Id. 
 330 The Internal Revenue Manual provides:   
(4) Penalty relief may be appropriate if the taxpayer exercised ordinary 
business care and prudence, but due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s 
control they were unable to comply with the law. 
(5) Factors to consider include:  
• Timing.  
• Effect on the taxpayer’s business.  
• Steps taken to attempt to comply.  
• If the taxpayer complied when it became possible. 
(6) The determination to grant relief from each penalty must be based on the 
facts and circumstances surrounding each individual case. 
Id. 
 331 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-47-021 (Nov. 25, 2005) (waiver based on 
2004 hurricanes granted late 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-46-044 (Nov. 18, 2005) 
(waiving sixty-day period for IRA rollover requested in April 2005, granted in August 
2005). 
 332 Unless suspended under I.R.C. § 7508A, the Code presently allows 
abatement of interest only where an assessment is excessive, or erroneously or illegally 
assessed.  I.R.C. § 6404. 
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upon the taxpayer’s bona fide assertion of a casualty.333  While 
such an extension might accrue to those whose records are 
intact and do not need an extension, the incentive to file sooner 
to obtain relief more quickly should be a sufficient motivator to 
prompt them to file as soon as they are able to do so. 
The IRS should be allowed the discretion to grant up to 
an additional year based on circumstances.334  This presents a 
more equitable approach (not favoring victims of one hurricane, 
fire, or flood over another)335 and a more efficient and timely 
process for the government.336  It also affords casualty victims 
the assurance that they will not face penalties if they are 
unable to meet original deadlines.  The cost of standardization 
and simplification would only be the time value of money for 
those who owe from the time their taxes were originally due 
until actually paid.337  
Finally, proof problems in establishing casualty losses 
with sufficient certainty would likely be reduced,338 as the six 
month relief would allow victims time to obtain government 
copies of their previous tax records and estimates for repairs 
and replacement of damaged property.  This increased 
information should eliminate some of the evidentiary problems 
confronting taxpayers when records have been destroyed and 
  
 333 Assertions would be subject to later verification by audit if necessary.  
Additionally, Congress could define a bona fide assertion to require the taxpayer to 
have proof of an insured loss.  Such a precaution could both foster insurance and shift 
the burden of initial corroboration from the IRS to the private insurance industry. 
 334 The same procedures as employed at present–notice for declared disasters 
and case-by-case determinations for other situations–could be used.  The key 
advantage to the victim in the latter case is that the application for additional relief 
could be processed during the six-month automatic extension. 
 335 On the heels of KETRA, Senator Chuck Grassley indicated, “We also want 
to help protect Katrina victims from undeserved IRS problems.”  Grassley, supra note 
222, at 1.  Such protection should equally extend to all disaster victims. 
 336 In all but the most extreme cases, taxpayers ought to be able to regenerate 
sufficient records and documentation to substantiate their return within the six-month 
period.  In addition to relieving the IRS of initial case-by-case determinations 
altogether, a taxpayer’s filing of actual returns at the end of the six-month period 
means that both the IRS and the taxpayer will be in a better position to determine 
actual tax liability than if the individual had to guess when submitting an estimated 
return based upon incomplete information.  For years, victims have been flagging their 
returns (most recently in red ink) to notify the IRS of a disaster, see, e.g., supra Part 
II.D.; the same procedure could easily apply.  In essence, compassionate treatment of 
victims trumps administrative convenience.  This is the appropriate moral balance. 
 337 Where taxpayers are due a refund, the government does not lose anything.  
 338 See James A. Fellows, Tax Issues, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 484, 485-88 (2006) 
(measuring and proving value of destroyed property for tax purposes is highly 
problematic).  Proof problems related to lost records and uncertainty in valuation 
would be eliminated if a credit was used instead of a deduction.  See infra Part VII. 
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also allow both the taxpayer and the IRS to make more well-
informed decisions.339  
If the government is concerned about potential fraud, 
simple protective measures could be implemented.  For 
example, a taxpayer could be required to attach verification of 
receipt of insurance proceeds to create a presumption that he 
or she has suffered a qualifying casualty loss.340  Such a 
measure would allow the IRS to rely on the insurance industry 
to screen out spurious claims and would serve the dual purpose 
of motivating taxpayers to secure flood or other casualty 
insurance.   
VII. CASUALTY LOSS CREDIT WOULD BETTER AID THE POOR 
Modern methods of advance preparation, early warning, 
and evacuation in response to projected landfall of major 
hurricanes have helped to save lives, but although you can 
move people to safety, the same is not true of their homes and 
property.341 
Direct federal aid is one way to provide relief to victims 
of major disasters.  Disaster relief programs, benefiting both 
individuals and businesses, are administered by FEMA and the 
Small Business Administration (SBA).342  One potential 
drawback of direct aid from the federal government is the 
  
 339 Fellows, supra note 338, at 495-98 (citing recent tax court decisions 
denying casualty losses even while acknowledging records may have been destroyed in 
the underlying disasters). Note that the proof of loss by “closed and completed 
transactions” required by Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) may also vitiate the utility of the 
I.R.C. § 165(i) election to take casualty losses in the previous year (for some victims), 
because taxpayers must already know which losses will be reimbursed and the extent 
of such reimbursement.  
 340 The IRS created several “safe harbor” methods that individuals could use 
after Katrina, Rita, and Wilma to overcome proof problems; one method deemed 
reports prepared by the individual’s homeowner’s or flood insurance company 
acceptable to show estimated loss.  Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61, 62, 65.  
 341 As this article was being written, a tornado ravaged Troy, Illinois, 
shattering forty-to-eighty-foot trees and sending trunks, limbs, and branches into 
nearby houses.  Although the author’s mother-in-law is among the victims, she will not 
be entitled to the waiver of the $100 or 10% AGI limits because the damage did not 
arise from Hurricanes Wilma, Rita, or Katrina.  Even if eligible, she would not benefit 
because she does not itemize. 
 342 Surprisingly, “the majority of SBA disaster assistance is directed to 
homeowners, to help rebuild their homes.”  Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Small Bus.: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) 
(testimony of Hector V. Barreto, Admin., U.S. Small Bus. Admin.), [hereinafter Barreto 
statement].  As of September 22, 2005, the SBA had “distributed approximately 
850,000 applications for loans to individuals and businesses.”  Id. at 3 (statement of 
Sen. Olympia J. Snowe, Chair, S. Comm. on Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship). 
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bureaucracy that accompanies such aid.343  Often, those who 
stand to benefit are not familiar with the programs available, 
and there are lengthy delays or cumbersome requirements 
associated with qualifying for the relief.344  Another drawback is 
that federal relief is only triggered in major emergencies 
(where state and local assistance are inadequate) and does not 
extend to the victims of arson, an isolated lightning strike, or 
other more particularized casualty.345  
While a detailed analysis of the potential difficulties 
involved in direct relief346 is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
worth noting that avenues outside the tax code are available, 
and arguably more effective, than traditional tax measures.347  
  
 343 Past relief efforts have at times been criticized for delays and denials; relief 
has been slow or has been imperfect.  See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 4, at 59 
(“[V]ictims confronted an enormously bureaucratic, inefficient and frustrating process 
that failed to effectively meet their needs.”); GAO-06-712, supra note 199, at 18 (“To 
help ensure that FEMA’s resource tracking system will meet the needs of those 
requesting FEMA assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of [Homeland Security] 
direct FEMA to ensure that it obtains input from the Red Cross as it develops a 
resource tracking system.”).  
 344 See  GAO-06-442T, supra note 38, at 1-2, 40 (describing the public’s 
widespread dissatisfaction with SBA and its backlog of about 100,000 hurricane-
related loan applications that created delays of approximately ninety-four days).  
 345 Because state and federal relief does not reach all victims, emergency relief 
organizations, such as the American Red Cross, are likely to deliver more aid, more 
quickly, and with less red tape.  The National Response Plan now names the American 
Red Cross as the lead agency for coordinating federal mass care assistance to support 
local efforts to respond to natural disasters. See GAO-06-712, supra note 199, at 10. 
 346 One problem that arises is ensuring direct assistance is distributed 
properly.  FEMA provided over $5.9 billion in direct assistance, “the most ever provided 
by FEMA to victims of any single natural disaster,” and more than twice the amount of 
Individuals and Households Assistance Program (IHP) dollars for the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake and Hurricane Andrew combined.  Fact Sheet, The White House Office of 
Commc’ns, A Commitment to Continued Recovery and Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast 
(Dec. 21, 2005), available at 2005 WL 348053.  Unfortunately, FEMA reportedly 
provided aid to 16% of individuals who did not really need it.  GAO, HURRICANES 
KATRINA AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF: IMPROPER AND POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT 
INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN $600 MILLION AND $1.4 
BILLION 4, GAO-06-844T (2006).  FEMA used limited procedures to review 
registrations for disaster relief—such as allowing individuals to apply for assistance 
via telephone or Internet—which “left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse.”  
GAO-06-655, supra note 3, at 2.  “Victims” apparently duped FEMA into grants for 
vacations and jewelry, among other things. FEMA Hurricane Cards Bought Jewelry, 
Erotica, CNN.COM, June 14, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/06/14/fema.audit. 
1908/index.html.  
 347 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 705, 721 (1970) (“[M]ost tax incentives have decidedly adverse effects on 
equity . . . . [They] are highly irrational”).  See also Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the 
Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 735 
(2002) (arguing that Congress should refrain from inappropriate tax changes to solve 
every social problem); John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 
ARK. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2002) (noting that increased reliance on the Code for assistance 
 
850 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3 
Additional relief in the form of tax breaks, however, would help 
both individuals and businesses get back on their feet.348  
(Although tax incentives to stimulate business recovery and tax 
incentives for families to recover are equally important,349 they 
are sufficiently different to warrant independent discussion of 
business measures in Part X.)   
According to the Congressional Research Service, “[i]n 
many ways, the tax system is not well suited to helping victims 
in disaster areas . . . .”350  However, tax relief to those who are 
likely to spend most of it—low and moderate income 
individuals—can effectively provide relief and stimulate the 
affected economy.351  Furthermore, as distinguished from pure 
welfare, income tax relief and incentives help those who are 
earning income. 
As a public policy matter, if the principal justification 
for intervention is the desire to help people who have faced a 
significant loss to reclaim their lives, the government is 
implicitly insuring the victims against loss by spreading the 
costs of the disaster among taxpayers as a whole.352  This 
“distributional” intervention spreads the risk of disaster 
nationwide.353  Congress must strike the right balance.  Relief 
as a safety net prevents people from becoming homeless or 
otherwise burdensome to society; however, too much relief fails 
to adequately penalize overly risky behavior.    
The current tax code strikes the wrong balance.  It fails 
to provide an adequate safety net for the poor.354  While tax 
relief aids some victims, the casualty loss benefits are most 
likely to help higher income individuals.355  Code Section 165 
  
may distort tax equities).  But see Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and 
Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 188 (2004) (stating that tax expenditure analysis 
should be grounded in a fuller appreciation of fiscal issues generally).  
 348 For a comprehensive discussion of the SBA benefits available to businesses 
and individuals, see Lipman, supra note 8, at 965-67 (discussing, among other relief, 
low-interest disaster loans of up to $200,000 for home repair). 
 349 Letter from Rahm Emanuel, supra note 305. 
 350 GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 5. 
 351 Id. at 3 (current spending is substantially related to current income). 
 352 Id. at 12. 
 353 Id. 
 354 There are several impediments to deducting casualty losses under I.R.C. § 
165, most significantly the need to itemize to benefit at all, the ten percent AGI 
threshold, and the $100 reduction.  See I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)-(2). 
 355 Only 46 million of over 132 million filers itemized for tax year 2004.  I.R.S., 
SOI Tax Stats—Individual Income Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report), 
tbl. 1.2 (Tax Year 2004), http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/ 
0,,id=134951,00.html [hereinafter IRS, SOI Tax Stats] (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (click 
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requires a taxpayer to itemize in order to take the casualty loss 
deduction.  Since the majority of Americans do not itemize,356 
most are not helped by this section.357 
Even for those individuals who itemize, the deduction is 
whittled away.  Section 165(h) reduces the deduction by $100 
for each casualty and also limits the loss to amounts exceeding 
ten percent of adjusted gross income (AGI).  The net result is 
that the average taxpayer receives less than $40 of tax relief as 
a result of this deduction.358  
As noted in Parts III and IV, the Katrina Emergency 
Tax Relief Act and the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 do 
away with these reductions for the victims of Katrina, Rita, 
and Wilma only.359  This relief is generous for the designated 
victims, but not generous enough for the tens of thousands of 
other casualty victims of 2005 (not to mention taxpaying 
generations preceding or to follow).  Furthermore, this relief is 
the most costly component of KETRA and was projected to 
exceed $2.4 billion in lost tax revenue.360 
To illustrate the inequities, if a single taxpayer 
(Taxpayer A) outside the GO Zone earned $50,000 AGI and 
suffered $10,000 of unreimbursed casualty loss, the most she 
could deduct would be $4,900.361  If an identical taxpayer was in 
the GO Zone, on the other hand, she could deduct the entire 
$10,000.362   
  
on table 1.2, tax year 2004 under Basic Tables: Returns Filed and Sources of Income).  
Fewer than one in three taxpayers with an AGI below $40,000 itemize, with far lower 
percentages at lower income levels.  Id.   
 356 Id.; see also Kurtz, supra note 288, at 165-66 (blaming much of the 
complexity of the tax code on itemized deductions). 
 357 The value of an itemized deduction is not fully realized unless a taxpayer 
already has sufficient deductions to exceed the standard deduction.  Perhaps this 
partially explains why less than one in one thousand taxpayers on average have 
claimed a casualty loss over the past several years.  See IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 
355, at tbls. 1.2, 2.1 (tax years 1993-2003).  For example, just 89,781 of 130,423,626 
returns claimed a casualty or theft loss in 2003.  Id. 
 358 See id. 
 359 See I.R.C. § 1400S(b); Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61, 62-63 
(applying safe harbor provisions to victims of Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). 
 360 JCX-65-05, supra note 160. 
 361 Ten percent of $50,000 AGI is $5,000, which is subtracted from the $10,000 
loss after the $100 is subtracted.  However, if her total itemized deductions did not 
exceed $5,000, she would be better off taking her $5,000 standard deduction and thus 
not derive any benefit from the tax break.  The standard deduction is governed by 
I.R.C. § 63(c).  See also Cost-of-living Adjustments for 2005, Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-
50 I.R.B. 970; I.R.S., 2005 1040 Instructions, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040--
2005.pdf. 
 362 See I.R.C. §§ 165(h), 1400S(b). 
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A similar taxpayer in the GO Zone earning $200,000 
(Taxpayer B) could deduct the full $10,000 of unreimbursed 
loss, although this same higher income taxpayer would be 
entitled to no deduction at all if she lived outside of the 2005 
designated hurricane relief areas (the ten percent AGI 
reduction would eliminate the Section 165 deduction).363 
The ten percent AGI reduction helps maintain a 
progressive tax code (higher income taxpayers must absorb 
more of their loss) and serves as an incentive to insure (by 
penalizing any loss whatsoever), but at the same time, it 
seriously erodes the amount of tax relief.  In the above 
example, Taxpayer B (in the GO Zone) gets more than twice as 
much relief as Taxpayer A (outside the GO Zone) even though 
they sustain the same losses and Taxpayer A earns only one-
fourth as much income. 
Another fault of the 2005 relief is that it affords more 
relief to those with higher amounts of uninsured losses.  For 
example, if Taxpayer B was fully insured with a $500 
deductible, her GO Zone tax deduction would be limited to 
$500; if uninsured, her deduction would be $10,000.364  The tax 
laws should not reward such risky behavior.  
Furthermore, there is an overwhelmingly regressive 
aspect to Section 165, both as codified and as modified by the 
2005 legislation, since the actual dollars of tax relief are driven 
by the taxpayers’ marginal tax rates.  Thus, a higher-income 
taxpayer will realize twenty-five cents or more on the dollar 
she is able to deduct, compared to, at most, ten or fifteen cents 
on the dollar for lower-income taxpayers.365   
A refundable tax credit of up to $1,000 per victim 
($2,000 per family for married filing jointly) would be more 
equitable.  Using the illustration above, Taxpayer A in the ten 
percent bracket would receive $1,000, as opposed to (at most) 
$490.  Taxpayer B in the twenty-five percent bracket would 
receive $1,000, versus $2,500366 under the present scheme.  
Thus, Taxpayer B would have an incentive to carry more 
  
 363 GO Zone deductions are subject to limitations on overall itemized 
deductions. See I.R.C. § 68;  see also I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)-(2) (outside the GO Zones, to be 
allowed any deduction, a $200,000 taxpayer would ordinarily need casualty losses in 
excess of $20,100). 
 364  Since there are no casualty loss reductions under KETRA, a taxpayer who 
itemizes may deduct their entire loss—ironically the loss of those who fully insure is 
only their deductible amount.  See KETRA § 402.  
 365  See generally I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d), (i).  
 366 Subject to limitations on overall itemized deductions.  See I.R.C. § 68. 
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insurance.  As this simple example illustrates, low income 
taxpayers would be much better off, and higher income 
taxpayers would not be favored, if a tax credit replaced the 
Section 165 deduction.   
What should a casualty loss tax credit look like?  
Certainly a nominal flat rate of $1,000 per single victim and 
$2,000 per family would be equitable, but this is not the only 
logical formula.367  Any credit could be phased out at higher 
incomes to maintain the progressive structure of the tax code 
and reduce foregone revenue.  Or, to motivate people to carry 
sufficient insurance, the credit could be either linked to or 
predicated upon an individual’s insurance deductible.  A flat 
rate enjoys the advantage of simplicity.   
Because maximizing aid is most important for those 
with the lowest incomes, any credit for casualty loss should be 
fully refundable.368  Only measures focused on refundable 
credits—those where the government will pay even after tax 
liability has been reduced to zero—will benefit the most 
impoverished workers.369   
The guaranteed $10,000 minimum tax relief to the 
victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks establishes a 
precedent for relief in excess of tax obligation out of sympathy 
for victims.370  Crafting the same full refundability for casualty 
losses would be optimally suited to those who are least likely to 
be able to afford complete insurance coverage and who are least 
likely to have any savings to fall back on in an emergency.371  A 
  
 367 There is no magic in the amount proposed, but over a million families 
(twice as many single taxpayers) could be helped with such a credit at a cost to the 
government of less foregone revenue than the $2.4 billion that the casualty loss 
deduction is expected to cost just for Katrina.  See JCX-65-05, supra note 160. 
 368 Additional deductions do not help workers in the lowest income groups 
(who really pay no income taxes), because their other deductions and exemptions 
already reduce to zero their tax liability.  See GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 2. 
 369 In the present tax code, the Earned Income Tax Credit, I.R.C. § 32, and the 
Child Tax Credit, I.R.C. § 24, are examples of refundable credits for qualifying 
taxpayers.  
 370 Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 
Stat. 2427 (2002) (codified at I.R.C. § 692). 
 371 One study found that about one-third of the advance tax rebate mailed to 
taxpayers in 2001 was spent in the first three months, and another third in the 
following three months.  GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 3 (citing David G. Johnson et al., 
Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001, at 20 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10784, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w10784).  This study also found that spending was greater for households with 
low levels of wealth, consistent with other evidence that lower income individuals have 
a higher propensity to spend.  Id. 
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credit provides an outstanding procedural benefit as well—
eliminating proof problems caused by a lack of records. 
A fully refundable, retroactive disaster credit would be 
even better.  Even with a tax credit, the difficulty in making 
tax relief meaningful remains timeliness—getting the money 
quickly into the hands of those who need it.372  Congress 
implicitly recognized this crucial timing issue in I.R.C. Section 
165(i).  Regrettably, this option to elect to treat casualty loss 
deductions in the preceding year is only available to those who 
suffer losses “attributable to a disaster occurring in an area 
subsequently determined by the President [to warrant federal 
relief].”373  Victims in these areas have a tax advantage.374 
In a sense, the tax code creates “tax-preferred” victims 
when a presidential disaster area has been declared375 and 
allows “super tax-preferred” victims of the 2005 hurricanes.376  
However, all victims of casualty losses should equally benefit 
from the same compassionate tax treatment.   
Although the IRS might complain that it is more 
onerous to allow relief to be retroactive, the need to treat 
similarly situated taxpayers fairly should outweigh these 
incidental costs.377  The same policy rationale—allowing relief of 
taxpayer hardship to outweigh increased complexity and 
administrative burden—applies whether a disaster has been 
presidentially-declared or not.378  A simple change to the tax 
code could allow all victims of casualty losses equal tax 
treatment.   
  
 372 GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 2. 
 373 I.R.C. § 165(i)(1).   
 374 However, those in the lowest tax brackets may likely have had no tax 
obligation in the preceding taxable year to reduce.  The Section 165(i) election is 
useless to these taxpayers. 
 375 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 139, 165(i).  
 376 See supra Parts III and IV for a detailed discussion of the different tax 
treatment of victims following the hurricanes of 2005. 
 377 For 2003, fewer than one in one thousand taxpayers used the casualty loss 
deduction.  See IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 355, at tbls. 1.2 and 2.1 (tax year 2003).  
Looking back at all available statistics on the IRS web site, 225,085 was the largest 
number of filers claiming casualty losses in any tax year (1994).  Id. at tbl. 2.1 
(providing data for tax years 1993-2003).  Even if these numbers tripled by extending 
relief to non-itemizers, they would amount to fewer than one percent of all returns.  
Changing the deduction to a credit, which eliminates the need for the IRS to verify 
actual losses, should more than offset administrative difficulties in issuing out-of-cycle 
relief for these victims. 
 378 The victim could simply write the name of the declared disaster area (or 
“casualty” where no disaster has been declared) in red on the top of their return or 
amended return. 
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VIII. EXPAND RETIREMENT ACCOUNT ACCESS TO ALL VICTIMS 
Just as Social Security serves as a disincentive to saving 
for retirement, it also provides a vital safety net to those who 
otherwise could not afford to survive on their own.  Similarly, 
tax relief for casualty victims should only be a safety net, not a 
substitute for prudent investment and insurance.   
Tax incentives for retirement savings, whether 
employer-provided or Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 
have motivated people to save for their retirement needs.379  
The government has agreed to defer or forgo tax revenues to 
foster this desirable public behavior.  These measures have 
helped millions of Americans better posture themselves for 
retirement.380  In addition to helping people help themselves, 
the aid helps to reduce the rolls of those who would otherwise 
be completely dependent on others (or the government) for 
survival.   
Over the years, Congress has devised a well-balanced 
menu of options to further this public policy goal.  At the heart 
of all plans, however, is the notion of an individual setting 
aside some of their present income in exchange for tax-free 
accumulation and later access to the funds.  Both this part and 
the next part below examine beneficial tax policies based upon 
the same principal.  If tax-deferred accumulation of wealth can 
be tapped without adverse tax consequences, victims will be 
better postured to provide for themselves in an emergency.  
The relief in KETRA and the GO Zone Act strikes the 
right balance in allowing these individuals to help themselves: 
victims may withdraw, without penalty, up to $100,000 from 
an eligible retirement plan (with an option to reinvest within 
three years as a rollover) and may prorate income over three 
years; or taxpayers may instead borrow up to $100,000 from a 
retirement savings plan at work and repay within five years.381 
There is no harm in allowing people to have access to 
their savings or to borrow from themselves in an emergency.382  
To the extent they repay or qualify for a rollover, there is no 
lost tax revenue compared to having their IRA money locked up 
  
 379  Victoria L. Bryant & Peter J. Sailer, I.R.S., Accumulation and Distribution 
of Individual Retirement Arrangements, 2001-2002, SOI Bulletin, Spring 2006, at 233, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02iraart.pdf. 
 380 Approximately fifty million taxpayers hold $2.5 trillion in IRAs.  Id. at 236. 
 381 I.R.C. § 1400Q. 
 382 In a sense they are borrowing from their “future selves;” failure to repay 
could hurt them in the future. 
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until retirement.  For those who do not repay or rollover, there 
is actually greater tax revenue now, as the income is realized in 
the three years from time of distribution, versus in the future 
at retirement age.  Finally, fewer restrictions on access to IRAs 
may encourage more people to use these savings vehicles.  
As a matter of horizontal equity, anyone who loses their 
home should have access to their IRA money without penalty, 
not just the victims of Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.  As a practical 
matter, many taxpayers facing daunting casualty losses may 
have nowhere else to turn for immediate cash.  The Senate 
agreed that all victims in presidentially-declared disaster areas 
should enjoy such relief383 (the later compromise with the House 
resulted in KETRA relief being narrowed to Hurricane Katrina 
victims).384  Enhanced access could categorically be granted to 
all casualty victims (declared disaster or not).385 
In terms of vertical equity, the benefit of these measures 
obviously does not extend to those who have no individual or 
employer retirement accounts, predominantly the very poor.386  
In addition, the wealthy may have no need for such relief and 
allowing enhanced retirement account access would be 
tantamount to an interest-free loan.  To combat these concerns, 
it should be clarified that such access would be in addition to 
the casualty loss credit proposed above.  To prevent abuse, 
taxpayers with incomes above a certain level (such as 
$250,000) could be designated as ineligible for this relief. 
Relaxed retirement account rules would create an 
important mechanism for those who need cash now and can 
afford to repay later.  For those who take distributions and do 
not repay, the immediate relief may come at the expense of 
their future well-being.  However, those desperate enough to 
compromise their post-retirement security should not face 
additional tax penalties, compounding their financial injury. 
  
 383 See S. 1696, 109th Cong., §101 (2005).   
 384 KETRA § 101.  
 385 The pool of eligible beneficiaries could be extended to anyone suffering a 
casualty loss; vertical equity measures, to prevent a windfall to the wealthy, would be a 
question of implementing sufficient limitations within the Code itself (such as income 
limitations for eligibility).  These considerations should not prevent Congress from 
harmonizing relief for future casualty victims with that offered to the victims in the 
present GO Zones.  
 386 Only one in five taxpayers with income below $20,000 have an IRA or 
retirement plan, compared to over half of all taxpayers with incomes over $100,000 
(who have an IRA, retirement plan, or both).  See Bryant & Sailer, supra note 380, at 
242.  
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IX. CREATE CATASTROPHE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
An old adage calls for saving for a rainy day.  Perhaps it 
is time people actually do so.  Unlike IRAs and retirement 
savings plans, there is no tax incentive to save for a potential 
catastrophe.  Given the pathetic savings rate in the United 
States,387 Congress should motivate people to set aside funds to 
help insulate them from the financial consequences of a 
disaster.  These catastrophe savings accounts should be crafted 
to be more suited to relief for disaster victims than enhanced 
retirement account access, because they can emphasize and 
complement insurance as a prerequisite to relief.   
For example, the size of these accounts could be capped 
to correspond to deductibles incurred during a disaster.  As the 
amount of the insurance deductible escalates, so too (to a limit) 
would the potential for relief.  Note that a higher deductible 
allows for lower premiums for the taxpayer.  Because the tax 
relief only pertains when there has been an actual loss, the 
savings from the reduced premiums can be invested over time.  
In this manner, the taxpayer is able to cover her out-of-pocket 
costs while insurance covers the remaining costs.  There is 
limited potential for abuse, because the money will be needed 
to cover the deductible.  
Two bills were introduced to advance tax relief designed 
to enhance insurance coverage and make it more affordable.388  
House Bill 4836, introduced by Florida Congressman Tom 
Feeny, allowed deposits into non-taxable “Catastrophe Savings 
Accounts.”389  Under this proposal, funds of up to $2,000 may be 
deposited for individuals with insurance deductibles less than 
$1,000.390  For those with larger deductibles, up to twice the 
amount of their deductible, or $15,000 (whichever is less) may 
be deposited.391   
  
 387 Nathan Dugan, Time to Rebalance Your Financial Habits?, 
INDYCHANNEL.COM, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.theindychannel.com/money/9638390/ 
detail.html (savings rate in 2005 entered negative territory for first time since 1933). 
 388 Policyholder Disaster Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2668, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (providing for tax-free accumulation of insurers’ catastrophic reserves); H.R. 
4836, 109th Cong. (2006) (providing for individual tax-free Catastrophe Savings 
Accounts, analogous to Health Savings Accounts, to offset consumer deductibles and co-
pays). 
 389 H.R. 4836, 109th Cong. (2006).  Florida created the notion of such accounts 
following the 2004 hurricanes.  See supra notes 151-54. 
 390 H.R. 4836, § 2 (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 530A(c)(1)). 
 391 Id. (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 530A(c)(2)). 
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Because the allowable deposits are not annual 
maximums, but rather are based upon insurance deductibles, 
the ability to contribute changes based upon insurance 
coverage.  Individuals who experience growth in the account up 
to their existing limits would have to increase the amount of 
their insurance deductible or face a taxable forced distribution.  
Presumably, many would increase their deductible to avoid the 
taxable event.  These same individuals would benefit from 
lower premiums when their deductible amounts increase.  
Ultimately, the provisions induce taxpayers to bear more of 
their own risk.  At the same time, the accounts ensure a 
reserve to meet the emergency costs.  
Essentially, such tax-deferred accounts both encourage 
insurance and motivate individuals to save for a rainy day.  
However, under the proposed legislation, tax-free access to the 
funds would be limited to presidentially-declared national 
emergencies.392  The same accounts could equally benefit 
victims of all casualty losses.  Because of the interconnected 
nature of the benefit and the insurance requirement, proof of 
an insured loss, as opposed to a presidential declaration, would 
be a more equitable trigger for tax-free withdrawal. 
In addition to such accounts for individuals, businesses 
should be allowed to set up accounts allowing tax deferred 
growth (up to predefined limits based upon their deductibles) 
and tax exempt access following a casualty loss.  By fostering 
insurance with a savings component to augment the insurance 
proceeds, businesses would have ready access to needed cash 
for rebuilding after a disaster.  Such mechanisms should 
reduce the need for other federal post-disaster relief. 
House Bill 2668 proposed tax-free investment growth 
for U.S. insurance companies of dedicated catastrophe 
reserves.393  Many other countries already allow tax-preferred  
accumulation in advance of the occurrence of a crisis.394  
Basically, those in the insurance industry would be permitted 
“controlled accumulation of pretax dollars in separate reserve 
funds devoted solely to the payment of claims arising from 
future major natural disasters.”395  Changes to I.R.C. § 832(c) 
would allow such amounts to be deducted from insurance 
  
 392 Id. (proposing amendment of I.R.C. § 530A(e)).  If not used, funds may also 
be withdrawn tax free at age sixty-two.  Id. 
 393 H.R. 2668. 
 394 Hartwig, supra note 26, at 208. 
 395 H.R. 2668 § 2. 
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company income.396  Like the catastrophe savings accounts for 
individuals and businesses, allowing the private sector to 
increasingly absorb the cost of major catastrophes takes some 
of the burden of the recovery costs off of the federal 
government.397 
Other bills proposed state catastrophe insurance pools 
with federal reinsurance.398  These proposals do not contain any 
per se tax implications; however, the state-subsidized 
insurance programs have been criticized by the insurance 
industry because taxpayers in that state end up buying down 
the premiums for those engaged in the most risky behavior.399  
Although protection should be fostered for vulnerable 
homeowners and businesses, they should pay premiums 
proportionate to the risk.400   
X. IMPROVE TAX RELIEF FOR SMALL BUSINESSES  
To be most beneficial, tax policy should foster recovery, 
rebuilding, and re-employment in the wake of a disaster.  Tax 
provisions that already exist can aid victims somewhat, but the 
relief may be largely ineffective due to the typical delay 
between time of loss and the receipt of refunds after filing to 
claim an incentive, credit, or deduction.401    
KETRA and the GO Zone Act created incentives to aid 
businesses in recovering and rebuilding.402  Many of these 
incentives could be employed whether the need is peculiar to 
  
 396 Id. § 3(a). 
 397 Andreas Milidonis & Martin F. Grace, Tax-Deductible Pre-Event 
Catastrophe Loss Reserves: The Case of Florida 40-41 (Ga. St. U. Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. & 
Ins. Working Paper No. 06-1, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=893154 (concluding that based on actuarial assumptions 
(which could vary), “the government may save significantly on disaster assistance”). 
 398 Natural Catastrophe Insurance Act of 2005, H.R. 4507, 109th Cong. 
(covering both residential and real property business losses insured or reinsured by an 
eligible state program); Homeowners’ Insurance Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4366, 
109th Cong. (covering residential damage from any catastrophes (other than flood) 
insured under a state program); Homeowners’ Insurance Availability Act of 2005, H.R. 
846, 109th Cong. (covering residential property losses from hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and their aftermath).   
 399 Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25. 
 400 The state or federal government could subsidize or insure those living in 
low-income housing, but should also ensure that such housing is not located in flood 
zones or hurricane-prone areas.   
 401 This principle is recognized implicitly and redressed somewhat in the 
ability to elect casualty losses in the preceding tax year for certain disasters.  I.R.C. 
§ 165(i)(1).   
 402  See, e.g., KETRA §§ 201-02; GO Zone Act § 102, I.R.C. § 1400R.   
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the victim (for example, isolated fire) or broad in scope (for 
example, town flooded, earthquake, etc.).  Others are more 
suited only to large-scale disaster areas.  The first section 
below addresses tax measures that could be codified to aid all 
disaster victims.  The later sections analyze how automation of 
special tax opportunities for major national disasters can 
equitably target future tax relief. 
A. The Special Need to Protect Small Business 
Our economy has created almost 5 million jobs since August 2003.  
Small businesses create most new jobs in our country, and small 
businesses have been a driving force behind America’s tremendous 
economic growth and job creation.  By adopting sound economic 
policies that help small businesses continue to grow and expand, we 
will keep our economy moving forward and create more jobs for 
American workers. 
—President George W. Bush403 
Small businesses are more vulnerable to catastrophes 
than large businesses—they generally have much lower cash 
flow and fewer cash reserves than their larger counterparts.404  
When small companies or family-owned businesses experience 
a loss, the loss is much more likely to be a devastating or 
terminal blow.405  Small businesses simply lack the financial 
wherewithal to weather the storm.   
A study of small businesses affected by Katrina revealed 
that few businesses had adequately prepared for a tragedy of 
such magnitude.406  For some, their emergency plans included 
backing up data and bringing it home.407  These folks did more 
than most; tragically, most resorted to methods that had 
allowed them to survive milder previous hurricanes.408  A sense 
of complacency and the notion that another hurricane was “no 
  
 403 Proclamation No. 7990, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,231 (Mar. 23, 2006) (President 
George W. Bush, Proclamation Supporting Small Business Week).   
 404 Runyan, supra note 158, at 19. 
 405 According to the Institute for Business and Home Safety, following a major 
disaster, “[a]n estimated 25 percent of businesses do not reopen.”  SBA, Disaster 
Preparedness, http://www.sba.gov/npm2006/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
 406 Runyan, supra note 158, at 15. 
 407 Id. at 17.  The SBA recommends all vital business records be copied and 
saved at an offsite location at least 50 miles away from the main business site.  SBA, 
FAQs (Disaster Preparedness), http://www.sba.gov/npm2006/faq.html (last visited Jan. 
9, 2007). 
 408 Runyan, supra note 158, at 17 (boarding up windows and/or doors). 
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big deal” got the better of many individuals and small 
businesses.409  
Another interesting dynamic of small businesses is that 
their business future and their personal well-being are so 
dramatically integrated.410  For many Katrina victims, this 
meant dealing with health, welfare, and safety issues at home 
before turning to the business impacts.411  Many of these people 
lost their homes in addition to their businesses.412  As with 
other hurricane victims, taxes were probably the last thing on 
their minds.  For these reasons, automated extensions of tax 
deadlines are vital to small businesses.413 
For tax assistance to be effective, it must be timely.  If a 
business is to be able to pay taxes at all in the future, it must 
survive today.  Retroactive tax relief is therefore critical to 
these taxpayers if tax measures are to have any immediate 
benefit.  Making relief retroactive cures the time lag otherwise 
inherent in tax cuts and allows access to refunds at the time 
funds are most needed.414  
Allowing a business to amend a previous return and 
treat casualty losses as if they occurred in the preceding tax 
year makes the tax subsidy more equivalent to direct aid.415  
This relief is presently available only in declared disaster 
areas.416  Horizontal equity requires, however, that similar 
taxpayers be treated similarly.  The opportunity to elect to 
deduct casualty losses in the previous year (so relief can be 
obtained sooner) should be extended to all businesses.  In the 
alternative, Congress should at least make this relief available 
to all small businesses.  A preference for small businesses is 
justified because of their increased dependence on present 
revenues to meet cash flow demands.  
  
 409 Id.  Because businesses had been through severe storms in the past, “the 
tendency was to downplay the ‘worst-case scenario’ that actually transpired.”  Id. 
 410 Id. at 21. 
 411 Id.  
 412 Id. 
 413 See supra Part VI. 
 414 Although such relief compromises the matching principle (expenditures are 
matched to income so that deductions correspond to the same tax year for which 
income was realized), it makes sound practical sense in this application.  See generally 
NEWMAN, supra note 283, at 137-38.  
 415 A cash infusion benefits the taxpayer as well as the relevant community, 
since such money is available to be spent sooner for necessary repairs, new equipment, 
etc., thereby bolstering the local economy.   
 416 This is only allowed by I.R.C. § 165(i) for declared disasters. 
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Along similar lines, a carryback of deductions for net 
operating losses (NOLs) is also helpful.417  The GO Zone Act 
authorized a five-year carryback.418  This is especially useful for 
flexibility to use the loss immediately.419  For example, if a two-
year NOL was allowed, but the business had not realized a 
profit in either of the two preceding years, it would get no 
relief; whereas the five-year carryback may allow them to reach 
back to a profitable period.  Or, if the business had a huge loss 
but a narrow profit margin in the past, the NOL could be 
carried back to all five years simultaneously.   
Allowing a standard five-year carryback for all victims 
of all disasters would be more equitable than only affording 
this relief in 2005.  As with the above recommendation, based 
upon their heightened vulnerability, all small businesses 
should be allowed this relief.  Congress gets more bang for its 
foregone tax buck by extending five-year NOL carrybacks to 
small businesses from all disasters, rather than all businesses 
affected by a particular disaster.   
Of course, any deductions carried back would be lost for 
the current year.  Therefore, this relief is essentially revenue 
neutral—the government is only allowing business losses 
(which it would allow anyway) to be taken earlier.  Yet, such a 
change would allow small businesses to pocket the tax savings 
at a critical juncture.  Given the turmoil of the disaster itself 
and the need to rebuild, one would expect a very positive 
benefit to those small businesses most seriously affected (the 
ones that most need the money immediately to rebuild). 
B. Opportunity Zones 
This section continues upon the notion of the tax system 
as a springboard to recovery.  While it is easy to envision that 
relief should be equitably extended so that none fall through 
the safety net, the recovery concept may also make sense when 
  
 417 The Code currently allows a two-year NOL carryback.  I.R.C. 
§ 172(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 418 GO Zone Act § 101(a), I.R.C. § 1400N(k). 
 419 Many small businesses begin in a loss position and do not become 
profitable until later.  The federal set-aside program for small disadvantaged 
businesses recognizes a five to  nine year timeframe until “graduation,” when the 
business can exist in a profit position on its own.  See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (discussing 
small business set-aside program generally); 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(15) (defining 
graduation and time limits of program). 
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trying to promote redevelopment in a target area especially 
devastated by disaster.   
Over a decade ago, the federal government created 
programs which use tax benefits to revitalize economically 
depressed areas.  While the legislation creating “Empowerment 
Zones” (EZs) and “Enterprise Communities” (ECs) contained a 
combination of grants, tax benefits, loans, and loan 
guarantees,420 the more recent “Renewal Community” (RC) 
legislation421 relies most heavily on tax benefits.422   
In 1994, when the programs commenced, the only tax 
advantage to early ECs was the ability to receive up to $3 
million in bond proceeds from tax-exempt state and local 
bonds.423  EZs could receive several forms of tax relief, including 
a twenty percent credit on the first $15,000 in wages paid to EZ 
residents who work in the EZ.424  The Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimated these programs would cost $2.5 billion in 
lost tax revenues from 1994-1998.425  
Renewal Communities were a byproduct of the 
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000.426  As the name 
implies, tax incentives serve as the impetus for community 
rejuvenation.  In addition to employment tax credits (fifteen 
percent of the first $10,000), the RCs enjoyed increased 
expensing under Section 179, as well as a choice of bonus or 
accelerated depreciation.427  The Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimated the newer programs would reduce tax revenues by 
$14.8 billion over the ensuing fifteen years.428  
Unfortunately, insufficient data exists to show whether 
these tax incentives are having the desired effects.429  
  
 420 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13301-
02, 107 Stat. 312, 543-57 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.; EZ 
and EC qualifications and eligibility codified at I.R.C. §§ 1391-97).  
 421 Consolidated Appropriations—FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 101, 114 
Stat. 2763, 2763A-589 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 422 GAO, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: FEDERAL REVITALIZATION PROGRAMS 
ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED, BUT DATA ON THE USE OF TAX BENEFITS ARE LIMITED 1, 
GAO-04-306 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04306.pdf.  
 423 Id. at 18. 
 424 Id. at 3.  Measures include tax credit for wages paid to employees who live 
and work in the enterprise zone, increased expensing (current year deductions) for 
depreciable property, tax-exempt bonds for facilities, and postponement of capital gains 
on the sale of qualified EZ assets.  Id. at 17-19. 
 425 Id. at 17. 
 426 See Consolidated Appropriations Act—FY 2001 § 101(a). 
 427 See I.R.C. §§ 1400H-1400J. 
 428 GAO-04-306, supra note 422, at 17. 
 429 Id. at 3, 6-7. 
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Nevertheless, they serve as a useful basis of comparison with 
the more recent Liberty Zone and GO Zone Legislation, and as 
a practical starting point for analyzing the merits of using 
targeted tax relief at all. 
In the case of rebuilding areas devastated by terrorists 
or hurricanes, “the question is whether the standard 
arguments for enterprise zones can be applied to rebuilding 
areas that are not (at least in their entirety) chronically 
depressed, but have been destroyed . . . .  It is not clear that 
they can be.”430  This author posits that while casualty loss 
relief to individual business victims should be universal, at the 
same time, opportunity zone relief (particularly tax-exempt 
bond advantages and tax relief from cancellation of 
indebtedness) should be severely restricted to scenarios of the 
utmost devastation.  
No one can forget the haunting images and devastation 
of “Ground Zero” following the 2001 terrorist attacks.  If ever a 
community needed a boost for economic recovery it was these 
citizens.431  The Liberty Zone, discussed in Part II.D.4, picked 
up on the notion of tax relief for community renewal.  The tax 
relief package included employment credits, bonus and 
accelerated depreciation, increased expensing for money 
reinvested in Liberty Zone businesses, and an extension of time 
(to five years) to replace destroyed property with like kind 
property in the Liberty Zone.432  The last advantage had already 
been codified at four years for victims of other declared 
disasters.433  The remaining advantages are discussed in more 
detail below. 
1. Employment Credits 
Employee retention credits are desirable for motivating 
businesses to retain their workforce in the wake of a disaster.  
Unlike the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), employee 
retention credits only accrue to businesses that had to shut 
  
 430 GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 11. 
 431 Indeed, even in 2007, Congress was discussing further extending Liberty 
Zone incentives.  Bonus Depreciation Extension Act of 2007, H.R. 827, 110th Cong. 
(Feb. 5, 2007). 
 432 I.R.C. § 1400L.  But cf. GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 1 (targeting tax 
subsidies after 2001 terrorist attacks not effective to speed up rebuilding, but may be 
desirable means of compensating victims). 
 433 I.R.C. § 1033(h).  It is debatable whether there is any material difference 
between four years and five years.  
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down and reopen in the disaster area.434  For this reason, they 
are more suitable than the WOTC to stimulate rebuilding 
versus relocating.  
However, these credits are expensive.  As originally 
envisioned, this type of relief was targeted at businesses with 
fewer than two hundred employees.435  With a maximum credit 
of $2,400 per eligible employee,436 the tax benefit could reach a 
theoretical cap of $480,000 per business.  When the GO Zone 
Act was passed, the small business limitation was removed, so 
large businesses could obtain even more relief.437  With the 
employee limit lifted, the theoretical cap went out the window.  
Lost too was the ability to funnel relief to those most in need—
the smallest businesses. 
Employee retention credits are a good idea to promote 
rebuilding.  To make relief more widespread and equitable, the 
credit should be extended on a scaled-down version to all small 
business victims of declared disasters.  A small business limit 
helps make this measure more fiscally responsible.  Capping 
the credit at $1,000 per employee and limiting it to the first one 
hundred employees438 would benefit those most in need while 
cutting the potential cost of the program dramatically. 
The declared disaster requirement serves a useful 
screening purpose; it targets relief to disasters so large that 
employees might be dislocated from the region.  Each time 
lightning strikes there is justification for casualty loss relief, 
even if only one taxpayer is devastated.  On the other hand, 
where tax relief is being used for regional rejuvenation or 
recovery, an additional threshold inquiry into the severity of 
the need is sensible to justify the lost tax revenue.   
Based upon past practice, the designation by the 
President of a National Disaster Area has served as a useful 
  
 434 Under KETRA, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit could be taken by any 
business (wherever located) that hired Katrina core area workers.  KETRA § 201(b)(2). 
 435 Id. § 202(c).  The Liberty Zone Credit was limited to businesses with fewer 
than 200 employees.  I.R.C. § 1400L(a)(2)(C)(ii).  Although using the WOTC construct, 
the Liberty Zone Credit limits relief to businesses and employees located in New York 
City.  Id. § 1400L(a)(2)(C)(i), (h). 
 436 KETRA § 202(a) (credit of 40% for each employee’s annual wages up to 
$6,000); I.R.C. §§ 51, 1400L(a)(2)(D)(iv)(II), 1400R (same). 
 437 See GO Zone Act § 201 (repealing KETRA § 202), I.R.C. § 1400R.  
 438 There should be no magic to the KETRA and Liberty Zone limits of 200 
employees. Federal size qualifications for small businesses usually vary based upon 
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) standards for the relevant 
industry.  13 C.F.R. §121.101(b) (2006).  The State of New York uses a bright-line, 100 
employee rule for state aid.  N.Y. ECON. DEV. LAW § 131 (McKinney 2006). 
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expedient to trigger certain tax relief.  For the Gulf 
Opportunity Zones, further narrowing of relief to declared “GO 
Zone” disaster areas, which FEMA had identified for individual 
or public assistance, ensured that the benefits were even better 
focused.  Similarly, the proposed reemployment credit should 
be maximally focused on the specific zones FEMA determines 
are eligible for individual or public assistance, striking the best 
balance between relief and fiscal responsibility. 
2. Increased Expensing and Depreciation 
Bonus depreciation, the ability to expense capital items, 
(especially clean-up and remediation costs) in the present year, 
and accelerated depreciation would help every business trying 
to withstand a devastating blow.  These measures do not allow 
the business to avoid income taxes; instead, they relate to the 
timing of when tax deductions occur.  When businesses take 
increased deductions up front, they necessarily lose the same 
deductions down the road.439  Unlike the employee retention 
credits, these benefits do not cost the public anything other 
than the time value of money. 
To the extent they are needed at all, bonus depreciation, 
the ability to expense capital items (especially clean-up and 
remediation costs) in the present year, and accelerated 
depreciation should be reserved exclusively for small 
businesses.  Small businesses are afforded a plethora of 
government benefits because of our societal recognition of both 
their value and their fragility.440  At the same time, affording 
such relief to large businesses is far more likely to be 
unnecessary for their corporate survival.441   
If Congress determines that these measures are 
warranted (the costs are outweighed by the value of 
  
 439 For a detailed explanation and useful illustrative examples, see I.R.S. 
Notice 2006-67, supra note 7. 
 440  For an excellent historical review of the evolution of small and 
disadvantaged business programs, see Maj. Thomas Jefferson Hasty, III, Minority 
Business Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) 
Program: Past, Present, and (is there a) Future?, 145 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994).  For 
observations of present trends, see Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Federal and New York 
Contracting Preferences for Small, Minority and Women-Owned Businesses, 8 
N.Y.S.B.A. GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 34 (2006).   
 441 Based on the availability of SBA loans to disaster victims, a powerful 
argument can be made that low-interest loans should be used to motivate capital 
investments as opposed to tax relief.  See Barreto statement, supra note 342, at 2 
(“Physical disaster loans provide qualified businesses of any size that have sustained 
uninsured losses up to $1.5 million with funds to repair or replace business property.”). 
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stimulating a post-disaster economy), then equity 
considerations should prevail so that such relief is automated 
upon a presidential determination that a catastrophe was so 
severe as to warrant classifying it as a national disaster area.  
Extending the same advantages to all small business victims of 
declared major disasters allows all devastated communities an 
equal hand in rebuilding.   
3. Automate Low-Income Housing Credit (LIHC) 
Housing shortages are also predictable following major 
catastrophes.  Virtually identical suspensions of LIHC 
requirements have stemmed from recent catastrophic natural 
disasters.442  Why not automate temporary suspension of 
income limitations so displaced individuals can reside in vacant 
low-income housing units?  Such relief could be effective the 
date the president declares the area a national disaster area.  
An advantage of automated statutory relief is that the 
government could address the issue of displaced persons 
globally, as it did after Hurricane Katrina, versus issuing 
proclamations individually in response to requests by affected 
states.443   
Congress could easily codify such relief for all future 
declared disaster areas where FEMA has qualified individuals 
for relief.  Statutory relief would offer significant procedural 
benefits by eliminating requirements for the affected states to 
request relief and the IRS to process and approve such 
requests.  The provisions included in the typical IRS Notice—to 
promote sheltering the victims of disasters, while protecting 
the rights of current residents of low income housing—could 
simply be included in the statute.444  The identical record-
keeping, rent restrictions, and protections for existing tenants 
should be retained to ensure the relief is not abused.  
Furthermore, the codified relief could mandate that the 
benefits be subject to approval of the state housing agency (a 
  
 442 I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, supra note 150 (relief in Alabama due to Ivan), is 
virtually identical to I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147 (relief in Florida due to 
Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne), and I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150 (relief 
in Ohio after Ivan).  See also I.R.S. Notice 2005-69, 2005-40 I.R.B. 622 (Hurricane 
Katrina LIHC relief); I.R.S. Notice 2006-11, 2006-7 I.R.B. 457 (following Hurricane 
Rita).   
 443 See I.R.S. Notice 2005-69, supra note 442; I.R.S. Notice 2006-11, supra note 
442. 
 444 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; I.R.S. Notice 2004-74, 
supra note 150; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150. 
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provision found in previous IRS LIHC relief statutes).445  Such a 
provision is all that is needed for a state housing authority to 
refuse such relief when no housing shortage ensues from a 
disaster; it would effectively allow states to veto unnecessary 
relief.  Similarly, the duration of the relief should be left to the 
discretion of state housing authorities, subject to a statutory 
one-year cap to ensure relief truly remains “temporary.” 
XI. TAX CREDITS TO PROMOTE MITIGATION  
Another way to address the temporary housing issue is 
to have fewer displaced individuals to begin with.  More 
resistant structures actually help both individuals as well as 
businesses.  Much of the damage from Hurricane Andrew 
resulted from buildings being inadequately constructed.446  The 
State of Florida and the insurance industry began a massive 
program to tighten building code compliance.447  In the 
aftermath of the hurricanes striking Florida in 2004, the 
insurance industry noted that the most severely damaged 
structures were those built before Hurricane Andrew.448   
In trying to restore solvency to the National Flood 
Insurance Program, Congress is looking for ways to better 
mitigate future flood risks.449  Along similar lines, the SBA 
proposed increasing the amount of lending assistance the SBA 
could provide for hurricane mitigation measures, such as storm 
shutters or construction of seawalls.450   
Hardening structures to a wide variety of perils would 
reduce federal exposure should Congress decide to expand 
federal insurance programs to all major catastrophes.  Even if 
Congress does not broaden the federal insurance programs, the 
entire nation benefits from avoiding the costs of casualty losses 
through lower insurance premiums, less risk to the insurance 
industry, smaller losses, and quicker recovery for affected 
individuals.  Congress should consider tax credits to stimulate 
mitigation measures. 
  
 445 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-76, supra note 147; I.R.S. Notices 2004-74, 
supra note 150; I.R.S. Notice 2004-75, supra note 150. 
 446 Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, supra note 25. 
 447 Id. 
 448 Id. 
 449 See H.R. 4973, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2006). 
 450 Barreto statement, supra note 342, at 4. 
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A window (perhaps three to five years) of tax credits to 
homeowners and businesses would incentivize taxpayers to 
invest now rather than later.  Congress could offer a credit to 
match a proportionate share of amounts invested in approved 
mitigation techniques.  The proportionate share could vary 
based upon income.  (For example, a dollar for dollar match up 
to a predetermined limit for taxpayers earning less than 
$20,000, ramping down to a ten or twenty percent match for 
taxpayers earning over $200,000 (up to the same limited credit 
amount).)   
This matching formula serves as a substantial incentive 
by making mitigation more affordable, especially for the poor.  
It is in the government’s interest to match these costs now to 
prevent far greater potential costs down the road.  After all, “an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”451  The 
government may save considerably on disaster assistance in 
the future if precautions are taken now. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The first and foremost lesson from Hurricane Katrina 
was “[n]o matter how prepared we think we are, we must work 
every day to improve.”452  The 2006 message from the National 
Hurricane Center was equally clear: “[P]repare, prepare, 
prepare.”453  Will Congress be prepared for future disasters?  
Will those affected by the next disasters enjoy the same tax 
relief as the victims of the 2005 hurricanes? 
For individuals, being prepared can mean the difference 
between life and death.  Financial preparedness is equally 
crucial to an individual’s financial well-being.  “For small 
business owners, being prepared can mean staying in business 
following a disaster.”454  A sound disaster plan can make the 
difference between being shut down for a few days and losing 
the business.455  Just as each individual and business must be 
prepared, Congress must prepare appropriate tax measures 
now, instead of responding once the next emergency is 
underway.   
  
 451 Benjamin Franklin, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 1735, at 1.  While the 
maxim was used in the context of fire prevention, it holds equally true for other 
emergencies.  
 452 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 4, at 4. 
 453 NOAA, supra note 1. 
 454 Runyan, supra note 158. 
 455 SBA, FAQs (Disaster Preparedness), supra note 407. 
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Standardizing and simplifying the Internal Revenue 
Code should benefit all victims, but particularly small 
businesses and low to middle-income households.456  Taxes 
should not discriminate based on the name of the tragedy.  
After all, “One hurricane hitting where you live is enough to 
make it a bad season.”457 
While the location of the next tragedy, the scope of the 
damages, who will be affected, how many will be affected, and 
how badly they will be affected may not be predictable, the tax 
consequences of the disaster should be both predictable and 
transparent.  Taxpayers need to prepare financially; they must 
know about tax consequences ahead of time to effectively plan. 
For example, tax incentives might motivate individuals 
and businesses to secure flood insurance or prompt them to 
invest in precautionary measures.  If tax-advantaged 
catastrophe savings accounts are codified, they can serve as a 
repository for “self-insuring” a portion of prospective losses.  By 
motivating the insurance community, through tax incentives, 
to set aside funds dedicated exclusively to national disasters, 
the government could help take some of the sting out of the 
next major catastrophe. 
Although it is too late to redress past inequitable tax 
treatment (favoring victims of some tragedies over others),458 if 
there is to be any equity for future victims, Congress must act 
now to standardize and optimize treatment of disaster victims 
in the tax code.  The tax relief proposed in this article satisfies 
the need for both horizontal and vertical equity among 
taxpayers and reflects America’s historic compassion to help 
those in need.  Preserving the most cost-effective and beneficial 
measures and trimming expensive and unrefined aid will 
benefit all Americans. 
  
 456 For a discussion of the benefits of simplification, see Testimony Before the 
Subcomm on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (April 6, 
2006) (prepared statement of Dennis B. Drapkin, Chairman, American Bar Ass’n, 
Section on Taxation), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode= 
printfriendly&id=4836 (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
 457 NOAA, supra note 1. 
 458 Cf. GRAVELLE, supra note 36, at 1 (arguing that tax subsidies for lower 
Manhattan after 2001 terrorist attacks may be desirable means of compensating 
victims for catastrophic losses). 
